Category Archives: Dawg Bones

Should UT have fired Major Applewhite?

Today’s Daily Dawg has nothing to do with football, but it does involve former UT quarterback and assistant coach, Major Applewhite.  I expect most readers will remember that name.  Major was the guy right before Vince Young.  Major’s name has come up in a lawsuit filed by former UT track coach, Beverly Kearney.

In 2012, UT informed Coach Kearney that it was planning to terminate her employment due to her inappropriate personal relationship with a student a decade earlier.  Coach Kearney admitted this indiscretion.  Rather than being fired, she resigned.

Then she filed suit.  Coach Kearney had been extraordinarily successful at UT. She coached the women’s track and field team for about 21 years and regularly lit up the orange tower with conference and national championships.  In her suit, she alleges that she won more competitions than any other African-American coach in the history of NCAA sports.  Moreover, at the time of her termination, she was the only African-American head coach in UT’s history.

It did not escape Coach Kearney’s attention that the University was planning to fire an African-American woman, but it did not fire white males who she believed had engaged in similar behavior.   In her suit Coach Kearney mentions a volleyball coach, various professors, a department chair and a high level administrator. But it was the assistant football coach who was mentioned most prominently.  UT did not fire Assistant Coach Applewhite after he acknowledged that he had a one-night stand with a student trainer after UT’s victory over Ohio State in the Fiesta Bowl.  The University imposed some disciplinary consequences on Coach Applewhite, but he remained on the staff, and later got a pay raise. In the lawsuit, Coach Kearney alleges that Applewhite and she engaged in similar misconduct. UT was about to fire her.  Not him.

But was their misconduct “similar”?  That is the big issue that this case will have to address before it is over.  UT filed a Plea to the Jurisdiction, seeking to get the case tossed out.  That Plea was partially successful.  The Court of Appeals in Austin ruled that some of Coach Kearney’s claims should be dismissed.  However, the Court did not dismiss the “disparate treatment” claim.

A termination case based on “disparate treatment” requires proof of four key facts: 1) the plaintiff was a member of a protected class; 2) she was qualified for her position; 3) she was terminated; and 4) she was treated less favorably than similarly situated members of the opposing class.  The University’s Plea to the Jurisdiction argued that Coach Kearney and Coach Applewhite were not “similarly situated.” But the court pointed out that UT offered no evidence to back up that assertion.  “Instead,” the court notes, “the University asserts only arguments as to what the evidence would show had it offered any.”  (Emphasis in the original).

Thus: Plea to the Jurisdiction denied. The case moves forward.

We expect UT will take another shot at getting this case dismissed prior to a trial, this time bolstering its assertions with evidence to compare Coach Kearney and Coach Applewhite.  If the pre-trial motions fail, this one will be decided by a judge or jury who will answer the question: were these two employees “similarly situated”?  If they were—why were they not treated the same?

For our purposes, the case is a good reminder of the importance of applying the same standards to employees who are similarly situated.  Furthermore, employers need to be able to articulate the rational basis for any distinctions.

The case of The University of Texas at Austin v. Kearney was decided by the Court of Appeals, Third District in Austin on May 3, 2016.

DAWG BONE: IT’S OK TO TREAT EMPLOYEES DIFFERENTLY, AS LONG AS YOU CAN EXPLAIN THE RATIONAL AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY REASON FOR THAT.

 

TOMORROW: CAN YOU BRING A GUN INTO THE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION BUILDING?

It’s Toolbox Tuesday! Let’s go over the drug offense rules.

On Tuesdays, we like to highlight the Toolbox—a one-day training program designed to equip school administrators with the ten “tools” they can use to maintain a safe campus while serving each student appropriately.  Tool #5 involves “special circumstances.”  Congress has identified three types of offenses that are serious enough that principals are given the authority to order a removal of the student to an “interim alternative educational setting” (IAES) for up to 45 school days. The principal can order the removal, but the ARDC must choose the IAES.  Most of the time, a district’s DAEP will be able to provide appropriate services, and so, it can be designated as the IAES.

But let’s back up a step.  The principal cannot use Tool #5 until it is established that the student has committed one of the three offenses. The shorthand version of the three offenses is: drugs, weapons, and serious bodily injury. But let’s take a closer look at the one about drugs.

The law says that “school personnel” can order the removal of the student:

in cases where a child….(ii) knowingly possesses or uses illegal drugs, or sells or solicits the sale of a controlled substance, while at school, on school premises, or at a school function….

Let’s focus for a moment on “KNOWINGLY possesses.”  So a student is brought to the assistant principal because a quantity of marijuana was found in the student’s backpack, or locker, or car.  Have you ever encountered the student who responded: “I had no idea! I don’t know how it could have gotten there!”

You may be inclined to blow that off.  Many administrators have told me, “Kids always say that.” Maybe they do. But the statute puts the burden on the school to determine that the student’s possession of drugs was “knowing.” We think the best way to do that is to provide the student the same due process procedures that are afforded to the general education student. Hear the student out. Consider the evidence.  Make a finding based on the evidence that you heard that the student’s possession was “knowing.”  Your conclusion, after hearing both sides of the story and considered the evidence, will carry a lot of weight.

DAWG BONE: YOU HAVE TO READ EVERY WORD IN THE STATUTE.

TOMORROW: SHOULD THE LONGHORNS HAVE FIRED MAJOR APPLEWHITE?

We had to wait until AFTER Mother’s Day to tell you about this one…

The Dawg hopes that all you mothers and grandmothers had a splendid day yesterday. We hope you were honored and celebrated for your many virtues.  We just want to go on record—the Dawg LOVES mothers, and respects all the efforts that moms make to keep their kids safe.  It’s just that sometimes, those efforts run into the law. That’s what happened to Judith Moreno.

Ms. Moreno alleged that her son was sexually violated by a teacher in McAllen ISD.  She sued the district, alleging that she told district officials what happened, but they failed to respond appropriately. Moreover, she alleged that the district ignored the “endemic problem on campus” concerning improper relationships between educators and students.

Ms. Moreno’s procedural problem was that she filed the suit on her own behalf—not as “next friend” on behalf of her child.  So she had to prove that the district violated her rights—not her son’s.  This turned out to be a problem.  The court noted the parent-child relationship is constitutionally protected, but not as broadly as Ms. Moreno would like. The court noted that the “case law is narrow and largely addresses the right of parents to make critical child-rearing decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of minors.”  The court summed it up like this:

Ms. Moreno is arguing that McAllen ISD’s actions allegedly caused her child harm, and as a result, she was deprived of her constitutionally protected rights.  The Court cannot find any case law in the 5th Circuit to support this argument, and Plaintiffs have not provided any relevant authority.

What about the fact that the boy was allegedly raped? The court:

While a student has a right to be free from state-occasioned damage to his bodily integrity, it is the student, or the parent as next friend, that must bring forth a claim that this right was violated.

The suit also alleged that the parent had suffered the loss of “consortium” due to the injury to her child. The court dismissed this, noting that “Texas law is clear and it does not authorize a parent to recover consortium damages for non-fatal injuries to a child, whether due to negligent or intentional conduct.”  Similarly, the claims for intentional torts, such as assault and battery, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress ran smack into the Texas law of governmental immunity.

All of Ms. Moreno’s claims were dismissed.  The court’s opinion did not address what the lawyers call “the merits.”  Was the boy sexually assaulted by his teacher?  Did the district ignore the mother’s complaint?  Was there an “endemic problem” on campus? This case answers none of those questions.  Instead, the case reminds us that the law requires judges to apply a cold blooded analysis, even when the case is brought by a hurting mother.

The case of Moreno v. McAllen ISD was decided by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas on April 18, 2016.  We found it at 2016 WL 1258410.

DAWG BONE: NOT ALL PAINFUL EVENTS CAN BE REMEDIED IN COURT.

TOMORROW: TOOLBOX TUESDAY!! WE WILL LOOK AT THE SPECIAL RULES FOR DRUG OFFENSES.

Dear Dawg: Our school buses drive by the home of our local nudist every day. Help!

Dear Dawg: First of all, let me say that we all like Cecil.  We all hold the view that what you do in the privacy of your own home is your business.  Cecil has lived here forever and has many friends.  But he does have his eccentric side.  Cecil likes to spend a lot of time sunning himself in the yard—sunning his WHOLE self.  Cecil is affectionately known as “our local nudist.”  Sometimes he has company—both male and female—nekkid as jaybirds every one of them.  Cecil has put up a privacy fence, so for the most part this is not a problem. But from a school bus, you can see right over that fence.  Unfortunately, the route our buses take requires every one of them to go right down Cecil’s street.  The kids find this very exciting, but we are getting parent complaints and are worried about our responsibilities.  Waddyathink? Any suggestions????  THAT’S THE BARE TRUTH.

DEAR THAT’S THE BARE:  You could let some air out of the tires.  You could tell the driver to create a distraction on the other side of the bus (HEY, KIDS—LOOK OVER THERE!!) and drive real fast.  You could declare this to be a field trip for credit in the health class.  Beyond that, we’re not sure. Of course you could talk to Cecil about it.  Since he has erected a privacy fence, it seems he is wanting to shield the general public from seeing evidence of his alternative lifestyle. He is also probably wanting to make sure that he does not get charged with indecent exposure.  It’s not a crime to go all Adam and Eve out in the woods where no one can see you.  Indecent exposure occurs when the person is reckless about whether or not others can see his private parts, and you are showing yourself off with an intent to arouse or gratify someone’s sexual desires. So we think you ought to let Cecil know that the privacy fence is not fully effective, and see if he can at least build it a little higher.  Good luck!

DAWG BONE: THIS COMES UNDER THE CATEGORY OF “YOU CAN’T MAKE THIS STUFF UP.”

 MONDAY: HOW FAR DOES “REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION” EXTEND?

Can someone get my personal email address through a Public Information Act request?

Let’s suppose that you are a member of the local school board.  You have an email address that the district has provided for you, and you are encouraged to use that account for all school-related business.  Of course you also have your personal email address.  Sometimes you use your personal account for school business. It’s just more convenient sometimes. Or perhaps you are communicating with a voter in the district who happens to have your personal email address.

Then someone files a PIA (Public Information Act) request for all school-related emails, whether on the district account or your personal account. Your lawyer has advised you that the content of your emails is “public information” and will have to be disclosed, regardless of what device or what account you used. But what about your email address? Doesn’t the PIA specifically say that an individual’s personal email address is confidential and can be redacted?

That was the issue in the recently decided case of The Austin Bulldog v. Leffingwell.  The Court of Appeals in Austin noted that the PIA does allow redaction of personal email addresses of “a member of the public.”  When the Austin Bulldog obtained email correspondence among the Austin mayor and city council members, the private email addresses of the city officials were redacted. The Bulldog went after those addresses (what…..you would expect the BULLDOG to back off?  No way!).  The Attorney General backed the city on this one. The AG construed the phrase “a member of the public” to be just as broad as it sounds. Read literally, “a member of the public” certainly would include the mayor and all of the council members.

But the city was dealing with The Bulldog! So the matter went on to court. The specific language in the PIA at issue was Section 552.137(a):

Except as otherwise provided by this section, an e-mail address of a member of the public that is provided for the purpose of communicating electronically with a governmental body is confidential and not subject to disclosure under this chapter.

It’s pretty obvious what the purpose of that section is.  Joe Q. Public sends an email to his elected representative.  Joe should not have to sacrifice his privacy for the privilege of communicating with a governmental official. So his address is confidential since he is “a member of the public.”

As the Third Court points out in its opinion, the term “a member of the public” is used to distinguish Joe from the elected representative that he is communicating with.  Thus the key holding of this case:

Accordingly, we hold that “member of the public” in PIA section 552.137 does not include a person who is part of the governmental body that was “communicat[ed] with” by email.

School board members sometimes say “I didn’t do that as a board member.  I took off my board hat and put on my private citizen hat.”  That can happen sometimes.  For example, suppose a school board member sends an email to Governor Abbott asking him to grant a stay of execution to someone on death row.  This has nothing to do with school business.  In that case, the board member is “a member of the public.”  But when someone files a PIA request for emails that address the business of the school district, the personal email address of the board member cannot be redacted.

The Bulldog case was decided by the Third Court of Appeals, Austin, April 8, 2016; Docket No. 03-13-00604-CV.

DAWG BONE: SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER’S PERSONAL EMAIL ADDRESS MIGHT BE DISCLOSABLE UNDER PIA.

 

TOMORROW: WHAT SHOULD WE DO IF THE BUS ROUTE TAKES US PAST THE HOME OF OUR LOCAL NUDIST????

Student misses out on top 10%. Files suit.

Rafael Rubalcaba III graduated just a bit outside of the top ten percent of his graduating class at Raymondville High School in 2013.  He claimed that this was a mistake, that the district should have given him more credit for a geometry class that he took in 8th grade.  In the suit, Mr. Rubalcaba alleged that the district’s error cost him a college scholarship and the opportunity to enroll in some of our top universities.

The trial court dismissed the suit and now the Court of Appeals has affirmed that decision.  The court held that the district was immune from liability.  The suit alleged that the board discussed the policy pertaining to GPAs in closed session, which would not be permitted under the Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA). However, there was no allegation or proof that the board took a vote in closed session.  Therefore, there was no basis for the court to exercise jurisdiction. On top of that, the student had graduated and enrolled in college, and thus, the court deemed the matter “moot.”

The decision also notes that Mr. Rubalcaba had administrative remedies available to him that he failed to take advantage of. He never filed a formal complaint with the district as per district policy.  Having never presented the matter to the RISD board, he did not have a basis to appeal a decision to T.E.A.  The court summarized: “We hold that Rubalcaba failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, i.e., he did not appeal to the Commissioner of Education, filed no formal complaint, and did not sign up to present his challenge to the Board.”

Case dismissed.  After the trial court ruled against Mr. Rubalcaba he filed a motion for new trial and sought sanctions against the district. That did not turn out so well.  The trial court not only denied the motion for new trial, it also slapped Mr. Rubalcaba with an order to pay $1500 to the school district as a sanction.  The Court of Appeals reversed that order.  It noted that such sanctions are reserved for “those egregious situations where the worst of the bar uses our honored system for ill motive without regard to reason and the guiding principles of the law.”  That was not the case here.  So Mr. Rubalcaba does not owe the district $1500, but he has lost his lawsuit.  In fact, he did not even get to present the merits of his argument because of his failure to overcome the district’s immunity, and his failure to pursue administrative remedies.

It’s just about graduation time here in Texas, so we thought we’d tell you about this case.  Be sure that you follow your district policy in calculating GPA.  With our top ten percent law and the scholarships that are available to students based on class rank, there is more at stake than bragging rights.  If parents or students feel they have been treated unfairly, refer them to your local district grievance procedures.

The case of Rubalcaba v. Raymondville ISD was decided by the Texas Court of Appeals for Corpus Christi-Edinburg on March 31, 2016. We found it at 2016 WL 1274486.

DAWG BONE: CALCULATING GPA IS SERIOUS BUSINESS. BE SURE YOU GET IT RIGHT.

TOMORROW! IS A SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER’S PERSONAL EMAIL ADDRESS ALWAYS CONFIDENTIAL?

It’s Toolbox Tuesday! Pennsylvania case shows how to use Tool #4.

On Tuesdays around here we like to highlight The Toolbox—a full day training program addressing your options when dealing with students with disabilities who present challenging behaviors.  Tool #4 involves a request for an expedited hearing to seek the removal of a student to an interim setting. We don’t see a lot of Tool #4 cases, but we found one from Pennsylvania that provides a textbook example of how and when this Tool should be used.

The student moved to the Upper Dublin School District in Pennsylvania at the start of this school year.  The student had been in a “neighboring state” in prior school years. The Upper Dublin district had the student’s latest IEP, but not a lot of other records. It implemented the existing IEP as the school year began, and things went just fine….for awhile.

The first major incident was on October 27th, when the student cursed, yelled and elbowed a teacher in the stomach.  Three day suspension.

November 17th--“another behavior incident, involving aggression toward students and staff, incendiary and threatening remarks, profanity, and toppling or attempting to topple furniture.  Six day suspension.

November 19th: the father filed for a due process hearing.

Early December: the district completes its evaluation of the student, rules out autism, but finds he has an emotional disturbance.

December 14: “another behavior incident….profanity, incendiary remarks, and threats to the school…destroyed property and threw objects…attempted to topple the conference room table.”  Five day suspension. That brings the cumulative total to 14 days of suspension—all within one semester of school.  Pennsylvania law requires an IEP Team meeting after 15 cumulative days.

December 22: IEP Team concludes that the student’s behaviors are a manifestation of his disability. No one disagrees.

There was one more incident on December 23rd, the last day before the break. The IEP Team conducted another MDR about this on January 7th and again concluded that the behavior was a manifestation of disability.  The district then began to explore private placements for the student.

January 13: the district recommends placement at its expense in a private school. But the father does not agree.

Let’s summarize: we have a student with a serious emotional disturbance whose behavior has escalated over the course of the year.  District staff report that the student does not de-escalate.  They are worried about someone getting hurt.  They have proposed a change of placement, but the father does not agree to it and thus under “stay put” the student remains where he is.  This fact situation is a prescription for the use of Tool #4—a request by the district for an expedited hearing to move the student to an interim setting for up to 45 school days.

The hearing officer held that the district carried its heavy burden of proof:

On this record, the District has carried its burden of proof that maintaining the student’s current placement is substantially likely to result in injury to the student or others.  This finding is based on the fact that each of the incidents of note (October 27th, November 17th, December 14th and December 23rd) involved contact with another individual, or non-contact aggression directed at another individual, and/or the throwing of objects or violent moving of furniture. The student also voiced threats to self and/or others over the course of these incidents. Finally, the testimony of District witnesses was credible and persuasive that the amplified intensity of the behaviors, and increasing difficulty in de-escalation, from incident to incident was a particularly grave concern.

The hearing officer ordered that the student be placed at the private program the school had recommended for 45 school days, during which time the parties would work toward a more permanent solution.

That’s how Tool #4 works. You want to change the student’s placement, but the parent will not agree. The behaviors of the student are a manifestation of the student’s disability. You are concerned that if things stay as they are, someone is going to get hurt.  There are no “special circumstances” present, so the law does not allow any school official to remove the student unilaterally. But you can seek an order from the hearing officer, as the Upper Dublin district did here.

The case is Upper Dublin School District, decided by a Pennsylvania special education due process hearing officer on February 10, 2016.  We found it at 116 LRP 8837.

DAWG BONE: TOOL #4 IS USED RARELY, BUT IT’S IMPORTANT TO HAVE IN YOUR TOOLBOX.

 

TOMORROW: HEY, IT’S ABOUT TIME TO DECLARE YOUR TOP TEN PERCENT, VALEDICTORIAN AND ALL THAT! CAN THAT LEAD TO LITIGATION???

Confused about how to deal with transgender students? Here’s some help!

The National School Boards Association has published a guide to serving transgender students in public schools. We think you will find it helpful.  You can go to the NSBA website and find this as a free download: TRANSGENDER STUDENTS IN SCHOOLS.  The Guide is written as a series of FAQs addressing the most common issues that arise in the operation of your school.  Here is the link.

The law on this subject is evolving. Of course “evolving” means that things are not exactly clear.  We know that students should never be bullied or harassed based on any characteristic, including the student’s sex, sexual orientation or gender identity.  We also know that Title IX regulations specifically permit separation of the sexes with regard to the use of the bathroom, locker rooms and sleeping arrangements, so long as the facilities are comparable. So is it “discrimination” to tell a transgender male (born female) that he cannot use the boys’ bathroom?  According to the first case to reach the Circuit Court level, it is.  The decision, G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board, was decided by 2-1 vote of a panel of the 4th Circuit. This is not a binding precedent for Texas schools which are in the 5th Circuit.  However, being the first decision of a federal appellate court, this is an important decision that will be a factor in all future cases.

The 4th Circuit’s decision is based on the concept of judicial deference to the administrative agency that is responsible for interpreting and enforcing a federal law. The court’s two-person majority found the Title IX regulations ambiguous with regard to transgender students and bathroom use.  In light of that ambiguity, the court held that it must defer to the interpretation of the Department of Education (DOE), as long as that interpretation was reasonable.  The DOE’s interpretation is that schools must “generally treat transgender students consistent with their gender identity.” This would mean that the transgender male must be allowed to use the boys’ bathroom.  The 4th Circuit majority held that DOE’s interpretation was reasonable, and thus the policy of the Virginia school district that barred the student from the boys’ bathroom was a violation of Title IX.  The dissenting judge found no ambiguity in the regulations, and thus no reason to defer to DOE’s interpretation. He would have upheld the school’s policy. The case is G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board, 2016 WL 1567467, decided by the 4th Circuit on April 19, 2016.

Litigation over this issue is going to continue for the foreseeable future.  Thus we recommend that you download and study the NSBA Guide.  Remember, also, that every issue that arises in your district concerning transgender students or employees should be reviewed individually.  The Guide published by NSBA is a good starting point for a general outline of the issues and how the DOE and the courts have addressed them so far. But there is no substitute for legal advice from your school’s attorney on whatever specific issues and cases arise.

DAWG BONE: THE CULTURE WARS ALWAYS FIND THEIR WAY INTO THE PUBLIC SCHOOL.

 

TOMORROW IS TOOLBOX TUESDAY! WE WILL REVIEW A CASE INVOLVING A STUDENT WHOSE VIOLENT OUTBURSTS CAUSED THE SCHOOL DISTRICT TO SEEK AN INTERIM REMOVAL.

Dear Dawg: Do you think the board is trying to send me a message?

Dear Dawg: our school board has come up with an interesting approach to posting the “no guns” signs in our administration building. At the last board meeting, they unanimously passed the following resolution:

WHEREAS, the board wishes to prohibit the possession or use of firearms in the school administration building; and

WHEREAS, the board wants to make this very clear to the public, by posting the appropriate signs; and

WHEREAS, it is well known that people don’t notice signs with a lot of words on the door of a building—they just walk right past; and

WHEREAS, the board wishes to assign to the superintendent tasks that he is capable of performing; and

WHEREAS, the board is tired of answering taxpayers questions about what exactly the superintendent does, and why we pay him so much;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the superintendent shall cause to be manufactured what is commonly known as a “sandwich board sign” which shall contain the appropriate language from the Texas Penal Code concerning both open and closed carrying of firearms, with said sign to be in English on one side and Spanish on the other, and that the said superintendent shall affix said sandwich board sign to his person and march back and forth in front of the entrance to the administration building from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., every business day until relieved of this duty by vote of the board; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the superintendent may not delegate this responsibility to anyone else.

What do you think, Dawg? Should I be looking for work elsewhere?  SANDWICH BOARD SUPERINTENDENT.

DEAR SANDWICH BOARD: Kinda looks that way, dontcha think?  But look on the bright side.  I don’t see anything in that Resolution that reduces your pay.  We know a lot of people who would be willing to carry a sandwich board sign for the pay of a superintendent. So enjoy the exercise, carry out your duties with enthusiasm, and look forward to your next evaluation.

DAWG BONE: WATCH OUT FOR CREATIVE SCHOOL BOARDS

Jury sides with the district in a nonrenewal case. 5th Circuit affirms.

The conventional wisdom among school district lawyers is that it’s best to win your case before it gets to a jury, especially if the plaintiff is a teacher. You just never know about juries.  But we do know that people tend to identify with the little guy.  All of us have been the employee. Not all of us have been the boss. So it’s noteworthy when a teacher vs. school district case gets to the jury and the jury sides with the district. That’s what happened in Waterman v. McKinney ISD. 

The school board proposed to non-renew Mr. Waterman’s contract due to allegations that he had behaved inappropriately with co-workers.  After hearing his appeal, the school board voted not to renew his contract.   The Commissioner affirmed this decision.

Mr. Waterman then sued in federal court, alleging that the district had violated his constitutional rights.  The court dismissed his claims that were based on the 9th and 14th Amendments, but the 1st Amendment claim was presented to a jury. The jury verdict was in favor of the district and the judge entered a judgment in accord with the jury.

The 5th Circuit affirmed the decision issuing an opinion that will not be published in the official reports. The appellate opinion deals more with procedural issues than substantive constitutional issues.  Mr. Waterman objected to the introduction of some evidence, and the exclusion of other evidence. The court found no significant error in the way the trial judge had handled the case:

This was not a case decided on sparse evidence.  Instead, the trial record is replete with evidence; much of it suggests that Waterman behaved inappropriately and made some coworkers feel uncomfortable and file complaints.

Mr. Waterman also complained that he was not allowed to amend his pleadings two days prior to trial.  The court noted that this was “nearly nine months after the amendment deadline had passed. This delay is inexcusable….”

The case was decided on March 22, 2016. We found it at 2016 WL 1127429.

DAWG BONE: WADDYAKNOW….JURIES SOMETIMES LIKE SCHOOL DISTRICTS