The Connecticut version of the UIL takes an approach to transgender athletic competition that is the opposite of how we do things in Texas. The rules in Connecticut permit students to participate in competition based on gender identity. Thus a student whose birth certificate reads “male” can participate in girls’ athletic events in Connecticut. But not in Texas.

Two such athletes did so and achieved state championships in track in 2019. Four girls filed suit, claiming that they were deprived of the “chance to be champions” and were subjected to discrimination by having to compete against athletes who were born male.

The federal district court dismissed the suit (see Daily Dawg May 10, 2021) and now the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed that decision. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege the kind of “injury in fact” that is required, and thus they lacked “standing.” All the concerns about diminished employment opportunities were highly speculative.

The court passed on the opportunity to make a definitive ruling about Title IX and transgender athletes. It did not say that Title IX requires a policy like Connecticut’s and it did not say that it prohibits a policy like Texas has. Instead, the court focused on the fact that the plaintiffs were seeking monetary damages.  Plaintiffs can recover damages under Title IX only if “recipients of federal funding had adequate notice that they could be liable for the conduct at issue.” 

Have the feds given clear notice that schools cannot allow transgender students to participate based on gender identity?  Hardly.  In fact, both the Obama and Biden administrations advised that Title IX required a policy like Connecticut’s, and when Trump took office the OCR did not overturn the Obama policy. It only rescinded the guidance on the grounds that the legal issues needed to be considered “more completely.”

So this case doesn’t resolve anything for us in Texas where we prohibit students from participating based on gender identity.  That practice is sure to be challenged, and we will duly report it in the Daily Dawg. 

I have to add one more thing about this case. The students wanted the records from the state championships in 2019 to be amended by removing the victories of the transgender athletes. The court refused to order that and included a lengthy footnote discussing controversies over home run records in baseball: Roger Maris or Babe Ruth or Aaron Judge?  Hank Aaron or Barry Bonds?  The court concluded that this “is not a debate for the courtroom.”

Now there was a Missed Opportunity. The sentence should have read: “This debate is for the BARROOM…not the COURTROOM.”

I’m sensitive to such missed opportunities because of a personal experience I had in Beaumont many years ago. I was representing some basketball players, trying to overturn a UIL decision that barred them from the state playoffs due to some “alleged” UIL violations.  I concluded my argument with “Your Honor, this matter should not be decided in the courtroom.”

I walked away and instantly realized that I had missed it.  I should have said “Your Honor, this matter should not be decided IN the court. It should be decided ON the court.”

I carry the regret to this day. 

The case is Soule v. Connecticut Association of Schools, Inc.  decided by the 2^nd Circuit on December 16, 2022. It’s cited as 2022 WL 17724715. 

DAWG BONE: TEXAS IS NOT LIKE CONNECTICUT.  YOU PROBABLY ALREADY KNEW THAT.

Got a question or comment for the Dawg?  Let me hear from you at jwalsh@wabsa.com. 

We now have a split in the Circuit Courts on the issue of which bathroom transgender students can use. This sets it up for a SCOTUS decision, but of course, that is a few years away. In the meantime, the 11^th Circuit’s decision is worth studying. 

The school board in St. John’s County, Florida required all students to use the bathroom that matched their biological sex at birth.  There was an alternative—gender neutral restrooms available to all students. This meant that Drew Adams could either use the girls’ restroom or the neutral one, but he could not use the boys’ restroom. 

Drew was born a girl and identified as female when enrolling in the district in the 4^th grade. However, Drew began to transition in 8^th grade, and entered high school identifying as male, using male pronouns and, at first, using the boys’ facilities. Then a couple of students complained. The school officials informed Drew that the boys’ bathroom was off limits for him.  Litigation followed.

I’ll just cut to the chase on the court’s en banc 50-page ruling. The court held that the school’s policy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, did not discriminate on the basis of sex or transgender status, and did not violate Title IX. Seven members of the 11^th Circuit agreed with that. Four members dissented.

For Texas school districts that choose to enact a policy like the one in St. John’s, this decision provides support.  It is the first Circuit Court decision to uphold a school policy barring transgender students from using the restroom that matches their gender identity. There are other Circuit Court decisions that have gone the other way—thus, a circuit split. 

Districts that want to follow the 11^th Circuit’s lead would be wise to also do the work that led to the district’s policy.  The district “engaged in a comprehensive review of LGBTQ issues affecting students.”  This involved research, attendance at conferences and consultation with LGBTQ students and organizations.  The district created a task force “which met with ‘district administrators,….principals,….attorneys, ….guidance counselors, and mental health therapists’ to hear ‘every perspective ‘ on emerging LGBTQ issues.” All this work resulted in a set of Best Practice Guidelines that included: “Transgender students will be given access to a gender-neutral restroom and will not be required to use the restroom corresponding to their biological sex.”

That accommodation would have satisfied some transgender students, but not all. It did not satisfy Drew Adams, who felt that he was being forced into a humiliating “walk of shame” as he bypassed the boys’ bathroom to go to the neutral one.

So where are we?  The law remains unsettled, and lawsuits can be filed by people on either side of the Bathroom Wars. Stay in touch with your school attorney on this issue. 

It’s Adams v. School Board of St. John’s County, Florida, decided en banc by the 11^th Circuit (7-4) on December 30, 2022 and is located at 2022 WL 18003879. 

DAWG BONE: CIRCUITS SPLIT ON THIS, JUST LIKE THE COUNTRY DOES.

Got a question or comment for the Dawg?  Let me hear from you at jwalsh@wabsa.com. 

Tomorrow: another transgender case, this time about athletics…..

At 10:00 tomorrow I’ll be Zooming along with my partner, Kelly Janes. This month’s Zoom call is going to focus specifically on Child Find. There is a lot of confusion and a lot of anxiety over this issue. Some directors are asking: do we really have to evaluate every student who presents the slightest challenge?  The answer to that is no. But in tomorrow’s Zoom call we will explain why some lawyers seem to be recommending that approach.  And we will offer some suggestions to alleviate the stress, while complying with your legal and ethical responsibilities. 

Hope you can join us at 10:00 tomorrow!

DAWG BONE:  ZOOMING WITH THE DAWG TOMORROW AT 10! BE THERE!!

Got a question or comment for the Dawg?  Let me hear from you at jwalsh@wabsa.com. 

Tomorrow: Circuit Court addresses the Bathroom Wars….

We’re using our Toolbox Tuesdays to review the Q and A released by the Department of Education regarding student discipline.  This week we cover Section I—Protections for Children Not Yet Determined Eligible for Services Under IDEA.  That’s a mouthful, which I have reduced to “the shouldaknown kids.”  These are students who 1) are in your general education population; 2) have violated a provision in your Code of Conduct; and 3) are entitled to all of the legal safeguards that IDEA provides for students with disabilities. In other words, these are kids who are not in special ed, but must be treated as if they were when it comes to discipline.

Here at Daily Dawg HQ we often remind you of the importance of calling your lawyer to get help on specific situations. With regard to this issue, it needs to be put in a different font.  CALL YOUR LAWYER!! This stuff gets way complicated.  The Q and A from DOE basically spells out what the regulations say, so it’s not terribly helpful.  However, there is one specific answer that they offer that may help. They tell us that “generally” a student’s participation in RTI or a multi-tiered system of supports (MTSS) does not mean that the student is a “shouldaknown kid.” That’s the “general rule” but you have to look at the facts. How did the kid get put into Tier Two of RTI? Was it due to a parent expression of concern? Was it because a teacher reported a “pattern of behavior”?

Let me explain why those facts would be important. 

There are three categories of “shouldaknown kids” and three categories of students who are specifically excluded. Let me illustrate with a series of short hypotheticals.  All six of these students are currently in general education. All six have committed an offense that would normally land them in DAEP.  Let’s add that the offense happened on today’s date: January 17, 2023.  But their situations differ. The first three are “shoudaknown kids.” The next three are not.

1. The parent of Student #1 sent an email to the teacher last week that “expressed concern…that the child is in need of special education and related services.”  That’s a “shouldaknown kid.”
2. The parent of Student #2 “requested an evaluation of the child’s eligibility…under IDEA.” This happened last week, and was not in writing, but it was definitely a request for an evaluation.  That’s a “shouldaknown kid.”
3. Student #3’s teacher “expressed specific concerns” about “a pattern of behavior demonstrated by the child directly to” the special education director, or “other supervisory personnel” like the principal.  This happened last week. Student #3 is a “shouldaknown kid.”
4. Last semester the school sent a written notice proposing to evaluate Student #4, and the parent would not allow it.  Student #4 is not  a “shouldaknown kid” and the school can proceed with disciplinary action.
5. The school did an evaluation of Student #5, determined the student was eligible and offered an IEP but the parent would not permit it.  Not a “shouldaknown kid.”
6. Student #6 was in the special education program until last week when the parent gave written notice of the revocation of consent to serve the student in special ed. Not a “shouldaknown kid.”

The most complicated part of dealing with these students is the completion of a manifestation determination when the school has not completed its evaluation, not determined eligibility and not identified any specific disability.  How do you do that?  The DOE says the school should focus on “the suspected disability” and use whatever evaluation data it has.  Of course if the evaluation can be rushed to completion in time for the ARD meeting that will be helpful, but there is no extension of the deadline for the ARD. It must take place within 10 school days of the date when the change of placement is proposed.

Example: let’s consider Student #1.  The student committed a DAEP offense today. But the student is a “shoudaknown kid.”  The ARD must meet to complete the manifestation determination within ten school days—that means by February 1. Can you get the evaluation done in that time?  If not, you deal with what you have and focus on the suspected disability. 

DAWG BONE: WE LEAVE YOU WITH THIS: GOOD LUCK. AND CALL YOUR LAWYER.

Got a question or comment for the Dawg?  Let me hear from you at jwalsh@wabsa.com. 

Tomorrow: Coming attractions!

WE’RE ZOOMING WITH THE DAWG ON THURSDAY!  HOPE YOU CAN JOIN ME AND KELLY JANES AS WE FOCUS ON CHILD FIND ISSUES.  FREE FOR ALL LOYAL DAILY DAWG SUBSCRIBERS.

I’ve got three books to recommend to you on this day when we honor the great American leader, Martin Luther King.  First, there is The Warmth of Other Suns by Isabel Wilkerson. This book tells the story of the Great Migration of African-Americans from the rural south to the cities of the north and west in the decades following World War I.  The book focuses on three people, one of whom moved from Mississippi to the South Side of Chicago, not far from where I grew up.   

My second recommendation is On Juneteenth by Dr. Annette Gordon-Reed.  Dr. Gordon-Reed, now a Harvard professor, tells what it was like to be the first African-American student in the Conroe ISD. This would be an excellent book study for a school faculty group, or as an assignment to students. On Juneteenth, is an easy read that will touch your heart and provoke some serious thinking.  It’s an honest look at our recent history. 

The latest book I read touching on race relations is How the Word is Passed by Clint Smith. It’s about how we remember and memorialize our country’s checkered past. 

We can’t ever fulfill Dr. King’s dream without taking a searching and fearless moral inventory of our past as a country.  These three books all facilitate that process.  It’s not about shaming today’s citizens for what happened in the past. But shame on us if we are not willing to examine past events and reflect on how they reverberate today.

DAWG BONE: LET’S KEEP THE DREAM ALIVE.

Got a question or comment for the Dawg?  Let me hear from you at jwalsh@wabsa.com. 

Tomorrow: Toolbox Tuesday!!

When you read the title of today’s Daily Dawg do you silently utter a “bless his heart”?  I did.  This student was completely wrapped around the axle when it came to writing. The boy was deemed “twice exceptional,” having superior intelligence along with several disabilities that impeded his progress, particularly in writing.  The parents ultimately put him in a small private school for 9^th and 10^th grades and sought tuition reimbursement. They alleged that the district failed to offer an “appropriately ambitious” IEP. 

It's true that the student’s goals for writing got less ambitious as the student progressed.  By the time he left public school the district had reduced his writing goals to completing only 50% of all assignments with a 50% extension of time on the ones he was expected to do. But the private school also had a hard time with the student’s writing goals, ultimately reducing the goal to “write without crying.”

The court did not make a ruling as to the appropriateness of the private school. The court ruled in favor of the district because it had offered the student a FAPE.  Key Quotes:

…repetition of IEP goals does not indicate a lack of progress where, each year, those goals are applied to a new and more challenging set of classes.

The fact that A.M.’s progress was below grade level is only part of the inquiry….

…the Hearing Officer’s conclusion that the District offered A.M. significant and professionally designed supports both inside and outside his regular classroom is well supported. 

Put simply, the information available to the District at the end of 8^th grade suggested that A.M. was already performing as well as could be reasonably hoped for.

It’s A.M. v. Wallingford-Swarthmore School District, decided by the federal district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on September 21, 2022.  It’s in Special Ed Connection at 81 IDELR 246.

DAWG BONE: WHAT SUBJECT IN SCHOOL BROUGHT YOU TO TEARS?  FOR ME IT WAS ART.

Got a question or comment for the Dawg?  Let me hear from you at jwalsh@wabsa.com. 

We’ve been telling you about a lot of Child Find cases of late.  Today—a case where two Texas districts were charged with a Child Find violation. The 5^th Circuit ruled in favor of both districts.

The student lived in Pearland ISD but attended a private school located in Houston ISD due to the student’s visual impairment.  The parent filed Child Find claims against both districts. The court limited its analysis to the one year preceding the request for a due process hearing due to the statute of limitations. In that one year, Houston responded promptly after it received notice that the student was moving to a new private school and might need special education services. This was in June, 2017.  HISD recommended a formal evaluation, conducted informal observations and completed its FIE in October. The court held that the district’s “intervening observations, or ‘proactive steps,’ to collect information necessary to determine” the student’s eligibility shows that “HISD’s delay between notice and referral was reasonable.”  No Child Find violation.

The parent made three arguments as to why Pearland should have “found” their child. First, the family moved from Houston to Pearland in 2014.  However, they did not contact PISD, or enroll the child there. Instead, the student continued in a private school in Houston. The court held that moving into the district was not sufficient to trigger Child Find:

S.S.’s move to Pearland—while remaining enrolled in private school in Houston—did not afford PISD notice that S.S. was a student with a disability within its jurisdiction, let alone that  S.S. had a disability.

Then there was the 2016 email that went to both districts, expressing interest in “vision services” and asking “how to move forward.”  PISD did not respond to this, but Houston did and the parent followed up with Houston, but not PISD. The court affirmed the lower court’s conclusion that this one email was not enough to trigger Pearland’s Child Find duty.

The third argument was based on the fact that in 2017 HISD contracted with a PISD employee to conduct an IEE (Independent Educational Evaluation) of the child.  The court held that this also did not put the PISD on notice of a Child Find duty. The court noted that the PISD employee, while acting as an agent for HISD, could not share personal information about the student with PISD.

PISD’s Child Find duty was finally triggered by an email in May, 2017 directly asking for services. The district responded the next day, scheduling a meeting and referring for an evaluation a month later. This was reasonable. No Child Find violation.

This 5^th Circuit decision is also noteworthy because it is the first to specifically mention the infamous 8.5% standard for special education eligibility formerly included in the PBMAS. The plaintiffs sued T.E.A. for a statewide dereliction of duty, citing the 8.5.  The court dismissed this charge without making any comment about the wisdom or legality of the 8.5 standard. Instead, the court noted that there was no Child Find violation by the districts in this case, and thus nothing to attribute to T.E.A. Furthermore, the district court found no evidence to support this claim and “on appeal the Parents fail to explain why the [lower] court clearly erred.”

It's an “unpublished” opinion issued by the 5^th Circuit on September 19, 2022.  I’m pleased to let you know that Meredith Walker from our firm’s Irving office wrote an excellent amicus brief in support of Pearland ISD in this case.  It’s Heather B. v. Houston ISD, 81 IDELR 241 (5^th Cir. 2022).

DAWG BONE: WE’RE TALKING ABOUT ALL THIS AT THE ZOOMING WITH THE DAWG NEXT THURSDAY THE 19^TH. HOPE TO SEE YOU THERE.

Got a question or comment for the Dawg?  Let me hear from you at jwalsh@wabsa.com. 

Tomorrow: an interesting IEP goal…

The Walsh Gallegos firm offers two webinars next week that you may want to sign up for. The details:

DATE:  January 17 at 10:00a.m.

TOPIC: Using Independent Contractors to Help with Staff Shortages

PRESENTERS: Shellie Crow and David Holmes

We know that many districts are struggling with staff shortages and the use of independent contractors offers one solution.  However, there are many legal pitfalls to be aware of in the use of non-employees.  Shellie and David will focus on the practical and the helpful as they guide you through this issue.

DATE: January 18, at 10:00a.m.

TOPIC: Legal Update for Special Education Evaluation Personnel

PRESENTERS: Paula Maddox Roalson and Christina Garcia-Henshaw

All decisions about what goes into a student’s IEP must be based on evaluation data. The district is responsible for assuring the quality and validity of all evaluation data. Thus we annually provide this update as there are so many legal ins and outs to be aware of. Paula and Christina know their way around these issues and will provide a comprehensive and practical review.

You can register for either or both of these at www.walshgallegos.com/events. 

We offer discounted prices for districts that are “retainer clients.”  What…you don’t know about that?  Well, give us a call and we’ll fill you in.

Meanwhile we are doing a webinar with TASPA (Texas Association of School Personnel Administrators) next week also. Details:

DATE:  January 18 at 10:00a.m. 

TOPIC: Recent Employment Decisions and You

PRESENTERS: Laura Rodriguez  McLean and Crystal Hernandez

We’re delighted to team up with TASPA for this one, the first of four webinars our attorneys will be providing.  This one comes at the right time, as your major personnel decisions are on the horizon. Laura and Crystal will review some relevant recent cases and point out the practical implications for you.  You can sign up for this one through TASPA: www.taspa.org. 

Then there is our monthly Zooming with the Dawg—a freebie for all Loyal Daily Dawg Readers.  For this month the Zoom call will have a particular focus—Child Find. Here are the details:

DATE: January 19 at 10:00a.m.

TOPIC: Do We Have to Evaluate EVERY STUDENT???

PRESENTERS: Jim Walsh and Kelly Janes

We are aware of the pressure you are feeling, part of it coming from lawyers who seem to be suggesting that the only safe course of action is to evaluate everyone. We hope to offer a practical and legally compliant process for addressing Child Find concerns the right way. 

DAWG BONE:  TIMELY TOPICS WELL DELIVERED—THE WALSH GALLEGOS WAY.

Got a question or comment for the Dawg?  Let me hear from you at jwalsh@wabsa.com. 

Tomorrow: speaking of Child Find….

We’ve been working our way through the lengthy Q and A released by the Department of Education regarding the discipline of students with disabilities. Today we look at Section H: Provision of Services During Periods of Removal. 

There are only two questions in this section. The first is about Tool #7: the FAPE Free Zone.  The question is about what services a school owes a student if the student is removed for disciplinary reasons for 10 days or fewer in the school year.  For example: your assistant principal orders a three-day out-of-school suspension.  What services does the district have to provide?

The Q and A tells us that the district may not have to provide any services. It has a duty to provide services “only if it provides services to a child without disabilities who is similarly removed.” The Q and A also tells us that information about this “must be included in the explanation of procedural safeguards it provides to parents.”

That made me curious. Has Texas addressed this in the Notice of Procedural Safeguards?  Yes.  It’s on page 5:

The school district does not provide services to a child with a disability or a child without a disability who has been removed from his or her current placement for 10 school days or less in that school year.

That’s why we call it the FAPE-Free Zone. It’s the only circumstance that relieves a district of the legal duty to serve the student and it cannot exceed 10 school days in the school year.

Of course just because you don’t have to provide services does not mean that you are prohibited from providing services. In fact, the Q and A encourages you to provide services:

Although not required, LEAs are encouraged to provide services during such short-term removals to assist children with disabilities to continue to make progress toward their IEP goals and to prevent them from falling behind.

We need to add one more wrinkle to this discussion based on state law.  Texas does permit a three-day suspension out of school and with no services. However, consider T.E.C. 37.005(e):

A school district shall provide to a student during the period of the student’s suspension under this section, regardless of whether the student is placed in in-school or out-of-school suspension, an alternative means of receiving all course work provided in the classes in the foundation curriculum under Section 28.002(a)(1) that the student misses as a result of the suspension.  The district must provide at least one option for receiving the course work that does not require the use of the Internet.

I highlighted this requirement in a training I did recently for some principals and was greeted with a lot of blank stares. I’m not sure everyone is on top of this. How does your district provide this “alternative means of receiving all course work”?

The rest of Section H in the Q and A is about removals that reach Day 11 and beyond. If there is a short term removal that carries you past 10 days but the removal is not a change of placement, then the services to be provided are decided by “school personnel, in consultation with at least one of the child’s teachers.”  In Toolbox lexicon, that’s Tool #8. 

If the removal is a change of placement, then it’s up to the ARD Committee to decide where and how the student will be served.  In the Toolbox we address this in Tools #5 and #6.

Next Tuesday we’ll move on to Section I in the Q and A—services to kids “not yet determined eligible.”  It’s complicated. Let’s review it next week.

DAWG BONE: THE FEDS KEEP SAYING “10 SCHOOL DAYS OR LESS.” SHOULDN’T IT BE “10 SCHOOL DAYS OR FEWER”?

Got a question or comment for the Dawg?  Let me hear from you at jwalsh@wabsa.com. 

Tomorrow:  coming attractions!

The case of the principal who was fired after her nude selfie was unlawfully disseminated by an unknown third party continues to do judicial somersaults.  I suppose that any lead sentence that includes “nude” “selfie” and “principal” calls for a bit of background. So for those new to the Daily Dawg, let me recap the facts. 

Ms. Esparza, a principal in Edinburg CISD, took the picture and sent it to her husband, toiling away hundreds of miles away in the oil field of West Texas. She sent it to her husband and only to her husband. I expect the husband was pleased with his wife’s thoughtful and flirtatious gift. But someone—still unknown—got access to the picture and sent it out far and wide. With predictable results.  The board wondered if Ms. Esparza could remain effective as a school principal, and  proposed termination of her employment. She asked for a hearing from an independent hearing examiner, and thus began the somersaults.  Here’s the scorecard so far:

Hearing Examiner:  Recommended that she not be fired.

The Board: Disagreed with that recommendation and fired her.

Commissioner: Agreed with the board.  She’s fired.

District Court: Nope.  Disagreed with the Commissioner. She’s not fired.

Court of Appeals:  Disagreed with the District Court. She’s fired.

I thought that would be the end of it, and duly reported it in Daily Dawg March 5, 2021.  But it’s not over. It turns out that Ms. Esparza initiated a separate legal action alleging gender discrimination.  This went first to the Texas Workforce Commission, which offers “the exclusive state statutory remedy for work-related discrimination and retaliation claims.”   TWC issued a “right to sue” letter, and Ms. Esparza sued.   

ECISD responded to the gender discrimination suit with a Plea to the Jurisdiction based on the legal doctrine of “collateral estoppel.”  This is a term that you should try to work into your everyday vocabulary. It’s challenging, but once you understand the concept, opportunities are sure to arise.  “Collateral estoppel” prevents a party from “relitigating an issue it previously litigated and lost.” ECISD pointed to the Court of Appeals decision in which the court concluded that the district had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing Ms. Esparza.  In other words—this issue has already been decided. She shouldn’t be allowed to bring it up again. 

Nope. The district court denied the Plea to the Jurisdiction and the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. The case was not dismissed. It ain’t over. 

Keep in mind that this Court of Appeals is the same court that earlier held that the district had presented good cause to terminate the principal’s employment. So why would they allow her to now bring up gender discrimination claims?

The court held that its earlier decision judicially established that the district had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to terminate Ms. Esparza’s contract. She could not re-litigate that issue. But the court went on to hold that Ms. Esparza could still pursue a claim that gender discrimination was “also a motivating factor” for her termination. The court noted that this “mixed-motive claim of discrimination” was not brought up in the earlier case, and the Commissioner  had “made no findings that we could consider as having a preclusive effect in that regard.” Bottom line: “whether the District was motivated by discrimination was not a fact fully and fairly litigated in the Commissioner proceedings.”

So it’s not over. In this suit, Ms. Esparza alleges that she was replaced by a male, and that there were five “similarly situated male employees” who were not terminated based on their misconduct.  As the case proceeds, she will have to tell us more about those five, what they did, and why it makes them “similarly situated.” I doubt that all five sent nude selfies to their spouses, but this case will test how “similar” situations have to be to pass the legal test.

Stay tuned, Loyal Daily Dawg Readers!   This latest iteration is Edinburg CISD v. Esparza, decided by the Court of Appeals for Corpus Christi-Edinburg on December 1, 2022. 

DAWG BONE: LET’S BE CAREFUL WITH THOSE CELL PHONES.

Got a question or comment for the Dawg?  Let me hear from you at jwalsh@wabsa.com. 

Tomorrow: Toolbox Tuesday!!