The decision of the 5^th Circuit describes a cinematic moment involving the third grader, the police officer, and the principal.  It starts with a “meltdown” by the student: “He became agitated and began throwing objects, pushing over desks, and hitting his teachers, resulting in the evacuation of his classroom.” The teacher dialed 911 and the Waxahachie Police Department showed up.

When the cop entered the classroom, “[the student] began running towards him and threw a chair at him.”  The officer caught the chair, grabbed the boy by his arms, and placed him on his stomach while the principal held the student’s head to keep him from banging it on the floor.  The court gave the officer credit for his efforts to calm the student down, but they were not successful.  Backup was called for, and the backup warned the boy that he would be handcuffed if he failed to calm down. He didn’t.  Then this:

Once he was in handcuffs, the officers were able to walk [the student] to the front office where his mother came to pick him up.  [The student], his mother, [the principal], and the officers then debriefed what happened and the conversation ended with [the student] shaking hands with one of the officers and hugging [the principal]. 

Despite that peaceful moment, the parties ended up in litigation, the parent claiming that the district was too slow to develop a BIP, and was otherwise failing to meet its obligations under IDEA. It first went to a special education due process hearing officer who ruled in favor of the district. The federal district court affirmed that ruling and now the 5^th Circuit has as well. 

The court’s 25-page decision is replete with citations to the testimony of the teachers and other direct service personnel.  The court summed up its decision with this:

In sum, this case is very fact specific given that the issues raised by [the student] on appeal mostly require our review of credibility determinations made by the hearing officer.

The basic dispute in this case was over the timing of the development of a BIP. In the spring semester of the student’s third grade year his behavior escalated, culminating in the handcuffing incident described above.  After that incident the district promptly offered to do an FBA and a BIP. But the parents argued that this was too late, that the district had enough information about behavioral problems in the fall of that school year and should have offered a BIP then.  But the hearing officer relied on the testimony of the teachers that the IEP was already appropriately and adequately addressing behaviors in the fall.  Key Quote:

In reviewing the record, we find that the district court sensibly followed the hearing officer’s reliance on the testimony from [the student’s] teachers, who interacted with him on a daily basis, to conclude that [the student’s] behavior was being adequately managed without an FBA and a BIP until February of 2017. 

The most important witness in a special education hearing is the classroom teacher. Here is yet another example of that: B.S. v. Waxahachie ISD, decided by the 5^th Circuit in an unpublished decision issued on March 23, 2023. The opinion can be found at 2023 WL 2609320. I’m pleased to let you know that the district was represented by the lawyers in our firm, led by Nona Matthews and Meredith Walker.

DAWG BONE:  WHEN TEACHERS TESTIFY, JUDGES PAY ATTENTION.

Got a question or comment for the Dawg?  Let me hear from you at jwalsh@wabsa.com. 

I took away three lessons from the Commissioner’s decision in Parent v. Center ISD. 

DUPLICATIVE GRIEVANCES.  First, Policy FNG, as most districts have adopted it, does not violate parental rights to pursue grievances.  This came up when the district dismissed the second parent grievance as duplicative of the first. The district relied on this from FNG:

Complaints arising out of an event or a series of related events shall be addressed in one complaint. A student or parent shall not file separate or serial complaints arising from any event or series of events that have been or could have been addressed in a previous complaint.

This all started when the parent filed Grievance One, appealing the student’s assignment to the DAEP.  After Grievance One was denied by the assistant superintendent, and while it was pending before the board, the parent filed Grievance Two.  This one was also based on the DAEP assignment but it took a different tack. This time the parent claimed that some administrators  “perpetuated a lie” about the student in their characterization of the incident.  Both grievances relied on video of the incident that prompted the DAEP assignment.

The district denied Grievance Two on procedural grounds, citing the language from FNG, and concluding that it was “duplicative” and had already been addressed in Grievance One.

The Commissioner affirmed the board’s denial of Grievance Two. In so doing, he held that FNG does not violate parental rights:

Section 26.011 does not require a merits decision on Grievance 2 but requires boards to have policies that address parent complaints under Chapter 26. Respondent has such a policy. 

GRIEVANCES SEEKING TO REPRIMAND EMPLOYEES.  There was another problem with Grievance Two.  The remedy the parent sought was some form of disciplinary action against the administrators who dealt with the original disciplinary action.  The Commissioner addressed this in a footnote:

Petitioner is not entitled to require board discipline of school district employees.  Complaints that educators have violated ethical standards can be submitted to the Texas Education Agency, which investigates such complaints. 

MERITS v. PROCEDURAL DECISION. Fundamental to the Commissioner’s decision in this case was the idea that the district can dismiss a grievance on procedural grounds without ever addressing the merits of it. That’s what happened with Grievance Two. The district made no decision about the accusations against the administrators, but simply denied the grievance because it was based on the same series of events and the same evidence (the video) as Grievance One.  Districts sometimes do this on the basis of timeliness as well. Decisions along those lines are permissible when supported by substantial evidence in the record.

It's Parent v. Center ISD, decided by Commissioner Morath on February 6, 2023, Docket No. 047-R10-07-2022.   I’m pleased to let you know that Christine Badillo from our firm’s Austin office represented the district on this one.

DAWG BONE: “SERIAL FILING” HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH HOW YOU ORGANIZE YOUR PANTRY.

Got a question or comment for the Dawg?  Let me hear from you at jwalsh@wabsa.com. 

Tomorrow:  the importance of teacher testimony….

Here at the Daily Dawg we have often mentioned the “Unwritten Rule” that courts and hearing officers seem to apply when they decide cases.  Today we report a Texas case that nicely illustrates how the courts apply this “Unwritten Rule”-- at all times and in all circumstances act reasonably.  That means respectful, kind, patient, courteous, and focused on serving the student well.

The Dawg reported the case of Washington v. Katy ISD in early 2022 when the district court issued its decision in favor of the district.  Now the 5^th Circuit has affirmed that decision.  It’s one of those cases where the parties disagree about the facts, and who was responsible for the student’s lack of attendance.  It’s an excellent illustration of the Unwritten Rule.

The story begins with what sounds like unreasonable behavior by the school: “In November 2016 [the student] was repeatedly tased by a school resource office during a confrontation with District staff.”  After that happened, the student did not attend school much at all.  He missed 98 days of school in the spring of 2017, and 200 days over all in 2017 and 2018.  Not good.  However, there was evidence of good performance when the student was in school, and there was a lot of evidence of the district’s good faith efforts to get the kid back in school.

Much of the decision is based on the interactions of the parties after the tasing incident.  The court noted a few factors that seemed to tilt the decision in favor of the district:

1.  “Multiple employees reached out to [the mother] after the tasing incident.”  An assistant principal talked with her about it on the day of the incident.
2. In a subsequent phone call “The assistant principal and [the mother] discussed the tasing incident, but [the mother] ended the phone call before the assistant principal could fully explain.”
3. The district pointed out that the mother had testified that she had spoken to the diagnostician “billions” of times; to one of the teachers “frequently,” to another teacher “every other day.”  This undercut the allegations that the district had been non-communicative.
4. The mother declined to give consent for district staff to discuss the student with some of his outside mental health providers.
5. The district recommended ESY, but the mother declined to accept the district’s offer of transportation for this.
6. It was difficult to schedule an ARD meeting, due in part to non-responsiveness from the parent.

The court’s opinion never uses the term “parental responsibilities,” but they are implied.  IDEA is built on a framework that assumes good faith collaboration between people who all want the same thing: that the student have a good experience in school.  This means that parents should actively cooperate in finding a time for an ARD meeting; give consent to evaluations that are called for, unless there is some strong reason not to; allow school staff to speak with outside professionals who have worked with the student; take advantage of any and all educational services the district offers.  In this case the 5^th Circuit summed it up like this:

Simply put, a parent cannot agree that the services her child is receiving are sufficient, prevent the school from administering those services by withholding the child, hinder the school’s ability to provide additional services by failing to file necessary paperwork, then later sue on the basis that the school did not do enough.

It’s Washington v. Katy ISD, decided by the 5^th Circuit in an unpublished decision on March 16, 2023. It’s cited at 2023 WL 2535273. 

DAWG BONE: BE REASONABLE.  AT ALL TIMES UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.

Got a question or comment for the Dawg?  Let me hear from you at jwalsh@wabsa.com. 

Tomorrow: a “serial filer”….

Tool #4 in our firm’s Toolbox involves the school seeking an expedited hearing, asking a hearing officer or judge to approve the temporary removal (no more than 45 school days) of a student for fear that maintaining the status quo will result in someone getting hurt. That’s a pretty desperate situation, which is why Tool #4 is used only when nothing else is available. 

Consider a recent ruling in a case from California. The 8^th grader was identified with autism and an intellectual disability and his behavior, as described in the decision, was way out of control.  Threats and attempts to commit suicide while at school. Elopement into heavy traffic.  Sexual assaults of others and attempts to do so.  All this was happening despite the best efforts of the district. Fearful that the student was likely to hurt someone, the district considered its options.  What were they?  Why did they end up with Tool #4?  Let’s consider.

Tool #2 can be used to change a student’s placement, but only if the parent agrees. The parent did not. 

Tool #3 can be used to change placement without parental agreement.  That would be available in  Texas, but not in California.  Its state law requires parental agreement for a change of placement, and puts the burden on the school district to seek a hearing if consent is not obtained.  That would take time, and the school was worried about someone getting hurt tomorrow. 

Tool #6 is a Disciplinary Change of Placement.  That was not available because the IEP Team determined that the student’s behaviors were a manifestation of his disability.

With none of the long term change of placement tools available, the district considered interim measures.  What about Tool #5? It allows schools to order a 45-day removal under “special circumstances.” This Tool can be used even if the behaviors are a manifestation of disability. So what about that?

The problem was that none of the student’s behaviors fit into the definitions of “special circumstances.”  Special circumstances encompasses drugs, weapons, and the infliction of serious bodily injury.  But there is no indication in the ruling that the student ever possessed or used drugs. Nor did he ever have a weapon. Those sexual assaults were of the touching variety, and thus, did not inflict “serious bodily injury.”

So the school then pulled Tool #4 from the Toolbox and asked a special education hearing officer to give it some breathing room by approving the placement of the student in an “interim alternative educational setting” for 45 school days. The school has to prove two things to get that order. It proved one. The hearing officer was persuaded that the student was dangerous and that his continued presence on the campus of a middle school was substantially likely to result in injury to the student or others.

However, the hearing officer denied the district’s request because the district did not identify a specific “interim alternative educational setting” that would be appropriate for the student.  The district said that the student should go to a residential treatment center for 24-hour supervision and care. It laid out the criteria that any such facility would have to meet to be appropriate. But it did not name a specific facility.  The hearing officer said “criteria is not a specific setting.” 

I suspect that decisions like this will produce strong reactions from educators, parents, and maybe even legislators.  Here we have a school district seeking to provide a safe school environment, while also recognizing its duty to serve students like this troubled 8^th grade boy.  But it all got tangled up in the law.  I don’t know what happened afterwards. I just read the decisions and tell you what I think we can learn from them.

I hope no one got hurt. I hope the district and the parents can come together to find some workable solution.  Sheesh. 

It's Escondido Union School District, decided by the California special education hearing officer on January 10, 2023.  It’s published by LRP in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Reporter at 123 LRP 6987. 

DAWG BONE:   TOOL #4 IS RARELY USED AND IS NO SLAM DUNK.

Got a question or comment for the Dawg?  Let me hear from you at jwalsh@wabsa.com. 

Tomorrow:5^th Circuit….

Mr. Vaughan’s lawsuit challenging how Lewisville ISD elects school board members has been given new life.  But the 5^th Circuit affirmed the lower court’s slap on the wrist of the lawyers who have been representing him.  I’m not sure which one of those is the major headline.

STANDING TO SUE.  Mr. Vaughan is challenging the fact that LISD uses the at-large system to elect all seven board members. He argues that this dilutes the voting power of racial minorities.  LISD pointed out that Mr. Vaughan is not a member of a racial minority group, and thus he did not suffer any “injury in fact” and therefore lacked “standing” to pursue this case.  The district court agreed with that, declared Mr. Vaughan’s suit “frivolous,” and ordered him to reimburse LISD for attorneys’ fees. 

The 5th Circuit has now reversed that decision in part. The court held that the lower court went too far when it declared the suit “frivolous.”  The court did not say that Mr. Vaughan has standing, but simply held that his argument was not so far “out there” that it could be labeled as “frivolous.”  So it goes back to the federal district court for more proceedings. 

THE LAWYERS.  The lower court ordered sanctions against Mr. Vaughan, the law firm that represented him, and the individual lawyers in the firm.  The 5^th Circuit reversed two-thirds of that.  As noted above, the court concluded that the suit was not “frivolous” to the point that sanctions paid by the plaintiff were appropriate.  The court also noted that earlier cases had concluded that sanctions for inappropriate lawyer behavior should only apply to the lawyers, not the law firm. But the court held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered the individual lawyers to pony up some money for making the depositions last so long.  Key Quote:

The attorneys questioned school board members on a range of topics that bear little relevance to a voting rights lawsuit, including a separate Title IX suit against the school district, claims of sexual harassment at a school, state standardized testing, mental health accommodations for students during standardized testing, and board members’ individual views on policy topics such as allowing teachers to carry guns on campus.

The court sent the matter back to the lower court with orders to “identify ‘which, in any, excess costs, expenses, or attorney’s fees were incurred because’ of the attorneys’ unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of proceedings through irrelevant deposition topics.”

It’s the latest, but probably not the last, ruling in Vaughan v. Lewisville ISD, decided by the 5^th Circuit on March 9, 2023. It’s cited at 62 F.4^th 199.

DAWG BONE: COURTS ARE VERY RELUCTANT TO DECLARE A SUIT “FRIVOLOUS” PARTICULARLY IF IT ADDRESSES CIVIL OR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

Got a question or comment for the Dawg?  Let me hear from you at jwalsh@wabsa.com. 

Tomorrow: Toolbox Tuesday!!

We’re hearing a lot about parents’ rights in the legislative session this year and we’re certain to see some changes in our Education Code designed to bolster those rights.  I think it unlikely, however, that the new laws will prohibit schools from restricting “any parent from access to their child or any programs in which the child is involved, for any reason at any time.”  That kind of sweeping statement fails to recognize some important factors. Such as the fact that some parents are also registered sex offenders.

This issue came before the Commissioner after a parent/registered offender was asked to leave the awards ceremony.  The parent alleged that the school’s decision violated three sections of the Texas Education Code, and one section of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

T.E.C. 1.002.  Section 1.002 calls for “Equal Educational Services or Opportunities” but the Commissioner tells us that this “does not mean that because one parent can attend a school event, all parents can attend the school event.”  The Commissioner offered an example: “a parent volunteer may attend the dress rehearsal for a school play because the parent is skilled in scenery changes and has volunteered.”  The law only requires that “individuals in similar circumstances be treated equally.”

T.E.C. 4.001.  This one is a “broad and aspirational” statement of “Public Education Mission and Objectives.”  The Commissioner says “It does not create enforceable standards.”

T.E.C. 26.001.  This is the opening section of the Parent Rights chapter in the Code and it offers a vision of parents as “partners with educators…in their children’s education.”  Parents are to be “encouraged to actively participate” with the school.  How about that one?

Nope. Citing a 5^th Circuit case, the Commissioner noted: “that parents are partners does not mean parents must be given complete access to their child.”

C.C.P. 62.065.  The parent in this case also cited the provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure (62.065) that directly addresses the duties of sex offenders in connection with their child’s education. That section requires that the person report their presence and their status to the school administrative office whenever they “enter the premises” of the school during standard operating hours. The law then says that the school “may provide a chaperone to accompany the person” while on school grounds. 

Does that mean that schools must allow a registered sex offender to attend a school event, as long as there is a chaperone?  No. The Commissioner reads the statute as permitting attendance with a chaperone, but the law “does not create a parental right to attend school events with a chaperone.”

It’s Parents v. Alvarado ISD, decided by the Commissioner on February 16, 2023. It’s Docket No. 056-R10-08-2022, and I’m pleased to let you know that Laura Rodriguez McLean in our firm’s Irving office represented the district on this one.

DAWG BONE: PARENT RIGHTS WILL PROBABLY BROADEN, BUT NOT THIS FAR.

Got a question or comment for the Dawg?  Let me hear from you at jwalsh@wabsa.com. 

The judge who wrote the concurring opinion said that “it is well past time for this circuit to be dragged screaming into the 21^st century by joining all of the other circuits that have now recognized the state-created danger cause of action.” 

What’s this about? 

It doesn’t make sense unless you understand that governmental entities and their employees are well protected from liability claims.  Consider the options for the parent of a student who suffered some serious injury while attending a public school. 

*A standard state law tort claim against the district based on negligence is unlikely to succeed. The district is immune from tort liability unless the injury arose from the negligent use or operation of a motor vehicle. 

*A similar claim against the teachers and administrators  will run into claims of immunity provided by the Texas Education Code. Unless a motor vehicle was involved, or the teacher was excessive or negligent in the use of force in a disciplinary context, the parents are probably out of luck. 

*Claims against the district under federal law will not succeed unless the plaintiff can show that the school’s policy or longstanding custom actually caused the injury. That’s rarely the case.

*So then you might consider a claim under federal law against individual school employees.  That’s when the doctrine of “qualified immunity” arises.

The parent of a student with a disability in Fort Bend ISD sued two teachers, the assistant principal, the principal, and the “manager” of the special education program. The facts alleged are grim, to say the least.  The opening lines of the 5^th  Circuit’s opinion lay it out:

A disabled public school student was sexually assaulted by another student with known violent tendencies.  Despite knowing of this attack, the victim’s teachers let both her and her aggressor wander the school unsupervised, and she was again assaulted by the very same student.

The parents alleged that their girl had been deprived of her rights to Due Process under the 14^th Amendment.  They alleged that the five school employees should be held liable due to the “state-created danger” doctrine.  All five school employees moved for dismissal of this claim because they enjoyed “qualified immunity.”  Pursuant to that legal doctrine, the school employees were immune unless they violated legal standards that were, at the time, “clearly established.”  The 5^th Circuit held that all five FBISD employees were entitled to qualified immunity. The 14^th Amendment claims were dismissed.

The court’s ruling was based on the fact that the “state-created danger” theory of liability has never been approved by the 5^th Circuit.  The court reasoned that a legal theory that has not been accepted is certainly not one that is “clearly established.”  That concurring judge I mentioned above agreed with the outcome of this case, but urged the court to join the many circuits that do permit suits alleging “state-created danger” as a viable theory: the 3^rd, 4^th, 6^th, 7^th, 8^th, 9^th, 10^th, and the D.C. Circuit.

We probably have not heard the last of this case.  Some of the judges will seek an “en banc” review which would be the proper vehicle for the 5^th Circuit to reverse course and allow suits alleging “state-created danger.”  Moreover, this ruling only applies to the Due Process claim. There is also a claim under Title IX, which the court noted “may well provide [the student] a remedy.”

It’s Fisher v. Moore, decided by the 5^th Circuit on March 16, 2023.  It’s cited at 2023 WL 2533113.

DAWG BONE: 5^th CIRCUIT STUBBORNLY CLINGS TO THE 20^TH CENTURY, ACCORDING TO THE CONCURRING JUDGE.

Got a question or comment for the Dawg?  Let me hear from you at jwalsh@wabsa.com. 

Tomorrow: parent is  a registered sex offender….

Springboards for Education is a Texas corporation that sells educational materials to encourage children to read.  In particular they market the Read a Million Words Campaign.  Springboards has taken four court cases to the 5^th Circuit accusing school districts of infringing on its trademark, by offering similarly worded programs, offering kids rewards for reading a million words. 

They sued Houston ISD and lost. They sued Pharr-San Juan-Alamo ISD and lost. They sued McAllen ISD and lost.  They sued the IDEA Charter schools and lost. 

Suits alleging trademark infringement require proof that the defendant has created confusion in the marketplace.  In the Springboards cases the courts have consistently held that there is little chance of confusion.  The latest opinion, which combined the cases against McAllen and IDEA, included this Wonderful Word Nugget:

To assess whether confusion is likely, we consider a flexible list of factors called the digits of confusion.

“The digits of confusion.”  Is that good, or what?!?!?!  Sounds like the name of a punk rock band.

This latest decision will be studied by law school professors because of its lengthy discussion about sovereign immunity of public schools and public charter schools. The court ended up holding that neither McAllen ISD nor IDEA charter school was immune from suit under the 11^th Amendment.  However, both defendants were entitled to Summary Judgment on the trademark issue. 

That sovereign immunity issue is for the Legal Eggheads to deal with.  As for me, I shall think of this case as the “digits of confusion” case. That’s what makes it Dawgworthy.

Springboards to Education, Inc. v. McAllen ISD and Springboards to Education, Inc. v. IDEA Public Schools were decided by the 5^th Circuit on March 8, 2023. 

DAWG BONE: DIGITS OF CONFUSION. INDEED. 

Got a question or comment for the Dawg?  Let me hear from you at jwalsh@wabsa.com. 

Tomorrow: another qualified immunity case…

Toolbox Tuesday: Another take on Child Find when behavior is an issue…

When does a school district have a legal duty to refer a student to determine eligibility for special education services?  The legal standard involves two “suspicions:” a suspicion that the student needs specially designed instruction; and a suspicion that a disability is creating that need.

Compare that standard with a speed limit on the highway. There is no subjectivity in the speed limit. You are either within the MPH limit or not. But a “suspicion” that a student “needs” a form of “specially designed instruction” due to a disability, when none of those terms are clearly defined, is highly subjective.  So  it’s not surprising to see different Circuit Court lean in different directions. 

In the 6^th Circuit the courts ask if the school officials “overlooked clear signs of disability and were negligent in failing to order testing, or that there was no rational justification for not deciding to evaluate.”  That standard leans in favor of the school district, deferring to the district’s judgment call even when it may have been wrong.  The 5^th Circuit where we live is a bit quicker to find a Child Find violation. 

I bring this up on Toolbox Tuesday because the most recent 6^th Circuit case involves a middle school student with behavior issues. Shortly after his family moved from Illinois to Tennessee he got into trouble at the school. Suspension and ISS and conferences with the parents.  In late September his parents put him in the Vanderbilt University Medical Center for a week after a blow up in the home.  In late October the boy was arrested at school, though the charges were later dropped.  The district proposed a disciplinary removal of the student to an alternative program. That’s when the parents withdrew him and homeschooled him for the rest of the year.  At that time the school was considering a 504 plan for the student, but nobody offered to test him for special education.

The parents requested a due process hearing, seeking reimbursement for the private schooling they eventually paid for, claiming that the district dropped the ball on Child Find.  The hearing officer ruled for the school. The federal district court affirmed that decision and now the 6^th Circuit has as well. 

The court cited the many school employees who testified that an IDEA referral would have been premature. These included a teacher, an assistant principal, the Exceptional Education Supervisor, a board-certified behavior analyst, and a school psychologist supervisor.  On top of that the school provided testimony from an expert on developmental trauma.  The court summarized its ruling in favor of the school district by noting 1) there was no history of special education for the student before moving to Tennessee; 2) he was in the school for a very brief time; 3) the family move from Illinois likely contributed to his behavior; and 4) all those expert witnesses.  Summing up:

It is true that WCS [the district] was neither as communicative, nor responsive, nor proactive as it could have been to meet [the student’s] needs and to respond to his parents’ concerns.  Still, on this record, we cannot say that WCS officials “overlooked clear signs of disability and were negligent in failing to order testing, or [had] no rational justification for not deciding to evaluate.”

It's Ja B. v. Wilson County Board of Education, decided by the 6^th Circuit on March 6, 2023.  It’s a published decision, meaning that it can be cited as precedent, and it’s located at 61 F.4^th 494. 

DAWG BONE: LAWYERS FOR TEXAS DISTRICTS WILL WANT TO CITE THIS CASE.

Got a question or comment for the Dawg?  Let me hear from you at jwalsh@wabsa.com. 

Tomorrow: do you encourage reading with a “Million Words” program?

Educators are sometimes embroiled in family law disputes after a divorce.  Consider this common scenario: mom lives in District A.  Dad lives in District B.  Who decides which school district the kids will attend?

Under the Education Code, the children in this family can attend either school.  But if mom and dad cannot agree, then who gets to decide? 

That brings us to the Divorce Decree and/or other binding legal documents.  In this case, the relevant court order had two important provisions. First, it stated that the mom had the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence, so long as she stayed within a 25 mile radius of where the family lived at the time of divorce.  Second, it said that decisions about the children’s education would be made jointly.

A few years after the divorce, the mom remarried and moved. She stayed within the 25 mile radius, but the move took her from Plano ISD to Lewisville ISD. She enrolled the children in Lewisville and dad was not happy about it.  He took the matter back to court.

The court ruled in the dad’s favor:

While Mother has the exclusive right to designate the children’s residence within a 25-mile radius, Mother and Father share the right to make decisions concerning the children’s education and must concur in the exercise of that right. 

In other words, the right to determine “primary residence” did not automatically include the right to decide on a school. 

When you are caught between two parents in a dispute like this it’s essential that you know what the current court decree says.  Keep in mind that a Divorce Decree will be entered at the time of divorce but it can, and often is, modified later as circumstances change. So you need to be sure you have the operative document. The lawyers at our firm can help with that.

This one is In the Interest of K.S.F. and K.D.F., decided on February 3, 2023 by the Court of Appeals in Dallas. We found it at 2023 WL 1501632,

DAWG BONE:  OPERATE WITH THE OPERATIVE DOCUMENT.

Got a question or comment for the Dawg?  Let me hear from you at jwalsh@wabsa.com. 

Tomorrow: Toolbox Tuesday!!