Do you have a clear understanding of exactly how the law applies to the search of a student’s cell phone?  No?  Well, then, you are right in line with the 11^th Circuit, which recently concluded that the legal parameters about cell phone searches by school administrators are anything but “clearly established.”

The plaintiff tried to pin personal liability on the assistant principal for searching a student’s cell phone.  The A.P. responded with a Motion to Dismiss based on “qualified immunity.”  The A.P. would be entitled to immunity unless he violated legal standards that are “clearly established.”  The court held that the A.P. was entitled to immunity because the law is not “clearly established.”

This all goes back to the case in 1985 when SCOTUS decided that the 4^th Amendment applies to searches of a student’s personal belongings, New Jersey v. T.L.O.  The Court ruled that the search would be constitutionally permissible if it was “justified at the inception” and “reasonable in scope.”  So in light of that decision, let’s think about what is “clearly established” and what is not. 

It’s clearly established that the search of a student’s belongings, such as a cell phone, is a “search” under the 4^th Amendment.  It’s clearly established that such a search must be “justified at inception” and “reasonable in scope.”  But the application of those two standards to a particular set of facts puts you in a lot of “not clearly established” territory. 

Context: this came up when an assistant principal searched a student’s cell phone looking for evidence that she was sending out ugly, demeaning texts about a classmate. Why would the A.P. do this?  Because the targeted student reported it, two other students confirmed it, and school policy prohibited bullying and disrespect.  Based on that, the court held that the search of the cell phone might very well be “justified at inception.”

The analysis of “reasonable in scope” was a slightly closer call because the A.P. did not just look at the text messages sent to other students. He also explored communication with family members and an ex-boyfriend.  If I’m the lawyer for the plaintiff, I’m going to scream “fishing expedition!” But the court held that this fell within the murky standards of the law, and thus, was not clearly established as a violation of the Constitution. The court pointed out that the student acknowledged that she sometimes used labels or emojis rather than names to identify people in her contacts list. So the court gave the A.P. the benefit of the doubt, holding that it was not “clearly established” that this was an excessively intrusive search.

The Dawg’s advice about searches remains as it has been.  Pause before conducting a search. Ask yourself two questions: what am I looking for? Why do I think it might be where I am looking?  The answer to these questions should be based on sensory data—what I saw, heard, or smelled.

Here, the A.P. was looking for nasty text messages that violated school policy. He was looking at a particular student’s phone because three other students had told him he would find the text messages there.  By the way: he found nothing.  But that did not make the search illegal.  It was within the not so clearly established standards for searches that the courts have given us.

The case is Jackson v. McCurry, decided by the 11^th Circuit Court of Appeals on March 12, 2019.  We found it at 2019 WL 1122999.

DAWG BONE: QUALIFIED IMMUNITY HAS SAVED A LOT OF EDUCATOR CAREERS.

Tomorrow: Is our sense of LRE outdated?

Dear Dawg: Snort, here.  Rip Snort. Intrepid Reporter. Hard Hitting Investigative Journalist, and Friend of the Truth. Dawg, I have been contacted by a young woman whose rights have been trampled upon by the local educrats.  The young woman’s 12-year old son has been labeled a “bully” by the local school officials  In accordance with her rights under federal law, the mother sought 1) copies of any records along these lines held by the school; and 2) an amendment of these records, specifically, a deletion of any reference to “bullying.”  The school has refused both requests.  Even worse, the school has not even allowed her to have a hearing about the request to amend records.

As you well know, Dawg, this lady is entitled to that hearing. It’s guaranteed by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).  Your faithful Intrepid Reporter and Friend of the Truth is no lawyer, but I know a FERPA violation when I see one.  I have advised this woman to take her case to the Family Policy Compliance Office (FPCO) for a ruling.  If she is not satisfied there, I told her the next step would be a lawsuit over the FERPA violation.  Thought you might like to know.  SNORT.

DEAR FRIEND OF THE TRUTH: Well, Snort, you got one thing right: you are no lawyer. If you were, you would know that the Supreme Court long ago put the kibosh on any private lawsuits alleging a violation of FERPA. See Gonzaga University v. Doe, (2002).   Moreover, FERPA gives parents the right of ACCESS to student records, but not copies.  As far as getting the records amended, FERPA permits this only if the records are inaccurately recorded, misleading or a violation of privacy.  Parents are not entitled to a hearing to challenge a substantive decision, such as the classification of behavior as “bullying.”  FPCO issued a Letter to Anonymous about this in 2017.  Key Quotes from the letter:

…an educational agency or institution is not required by FERPA to afford a parent or eligible student the right to seek to change substantive decisions made by school officials, such as grades or other evaluations of a student.

…this right [to seek a change in the records] cannot be used to challenge a grade or an individual’s opinion, unless the grade or the opinion has been inaccurately recorded.

Thanks for keeping us in the loop! This FPCO Letter to Anonymous was issued July 20, 2017 and we found it at 117 LRP 42291.

DAWG BONE: CAN YOU IMAGINE HAVING TO PROVIDE A HEARING TO ANY PARENT WHO THOUGHT THE C SHOULD BE A B?  OR THE B AN A?

Tomorrow: Another A.P. searches another student’s cell phone.  Another A.P. gets sued.

I’m pleased to report that Toolbox 4.0 has made its debut! My law partner, Denise Hays, and I presented the new and improved version of the Toolbox at Region 7 in Kilgore last Tuesday. It was delightful to visit East Texas on a beautiful spring day and sample gator tacos—a new one for me—from The Catch, a Kilgore restaurant. I recommend it!

For today’s Toolbox Tuesday we will tell you about a letter from OSEP that addresses what I call the “shouldaknown kids.” These are students who are NOT in your special education program, and yet, they are entitled to the legal protections of the special education law, including a manifestation determination prior to a long term DAEP assignment. The law says that there are some kids that the district is “deemed to have knowledge” that they fall into this category. In other words, “you shouldaknown.”

Who are they? They fall into three categories.

*First, there are students whose parents requested a special education evaluation.

*Second, the students whose parents expressed concerns in writing that the child may need special education services. This written expression of concern must be addressed to supervisory or administrative personnel, or to one of the child’s teachers.

*Third, students for whom a school employee expressed “specific concerns about a pattern of behavior demonstrated by the child.” This expression of concern must go to the special education director or other supervisory personnel.

Students are in one of these three categories only if the request or expression of concern occurs prior to the offense for which disciplinary action is proposed. If mom requests an evaluation on Monday, and the student assaults a teacher on Tuesday, the kid is protected by the law. If the assault is on Monday and the request is on Tuesday, not so.

There are some other specifics about how this works laid out in the regulation at 34 CFR 300.534, but this gives you the basics.

So let’s think about the practical problems that arise when a student falls into the “shouldaknown” category. Consider: the district is expected to conduct a manifestation determination review (MDR) but the student has not even been evaluated, much less determined to be eligible. How does that work? There is a tight timeline (10 school days) for completion of the MDR. Can the district postpone the MDR until the evaluation is completed?

OSEP says no. As the letter points out, the regulations allow for no exceptions to the timeline for conducting the MDR. If the evaluation can be completed prior to that deadline, fine and good. The ARDC will be ready to make an eligibility determination and an MDR. But that will rarely happen. So what do we do if we are unable to complete the evaluation that quickly? OSEP tells us that the school must use available information to determine if the behavior of the student was a manifestation of the “suspected disability.” The letter also states that parents must be given notice of the procedural safeguards they enjoy in conjunction with proposed disciplinary action. Referring the parent to the website where the procedural safeguards are posted is not adequate:

…the public agency would not meet its obligation to provide a parent the notice of procedural safeguards by simply directing a parent to the web site. Rather, a public agency must still offer parents a printed copy of the procedural safeguards notice.

If you are forced to make an MDR based on a “suspected disability” it would seem prudent to also offer to come back and take another look at it after the evaluation is complete. If the evaluation reveals that the student does have a disability that qualified the student for special education, the ARDC can take a second look at the MDR, this time dealing with the established disability—not the suspected one.

This comes from Letter to Nathan, which was issued by OSEP on January 29, 2019.  We found it at 73 IDELR 240.

DAWG BONE:  WHAT….YOU WANTED IT TO BE EASY?

Tomorrow: Hard Hitting Reporter Rip Snort is on to something.  Or thinks he is.

Fourteen states have enacted laws designed to enhance the freedom of student journalists. These laws came about in response to a 1988 SCOTUS decision that clipped the wings of budding Anderson Coopers. SCOTUS held that school administrators could censor school sponsored publications, such as the student newspaper, yearbook, and school play, so long as they had “legitimate pedagogical reasons” for doing so, Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier. Texas is not one of the 14 states, but we do have bills pending that would add the Lone Star State to the list: HB 2244 and SB 514.

These laws, in general, allow students to express themselves in school sponsored publications in any manner that does not cause a major disruption of school. Of course libel and obscenity must be avoided, but censorship based on “legitimate pedagogical reasons” would no longer be permitted.

One of these laws, the Kansas Student Publications Act, (KSPA) was discussed in litigation arising out of a student walkout/protest after the Parkland school massacre. The lawsuit alleged that school administrators barred student journalists from a part of the protest, and seized the camera that had been provided to a student reporter for her work on the student newspaper. The court held that the KSPA could be enforced through a “private right of action.” This is legalese for “you can be held liable for violating this law.” The court also held that the allegations about barring the student reporters and taking away the camera were sufficient to allege a viable claim under the Act.

It will be interesting to see if Texas enacts a law along these lines. In the meantime, can you guess which 14 states have already done so? You will be surprised at some of them….like Kansas, for example. The Dawg offers a free one year extension of your Daily Dawg subscription for the first reader to correctly identify all 14 states. Send your responses to jwalsh@wabsa.com. To do your research on this, check out the Student Press Law Center: www.splc.org.

The case from Kansas is M.C. v. Shawnee Mission USD No. 512, decided by the federal court for the state of Kansas on January 28, 2019. We found it at 2019 WL 339545.

DAWG BONE: KANSAS??? REALLY?????

Tomorrow: Toolbox Tuesday looks at the “ShouldaKnown Kids.”

Tomorrow marks the 20^th anniversary of the school shooting in Columbine, and the first anniversary of the student walkout in Shawnee Mission, Kansas.  The students in Shawnee Mission organized a brief walkout as did thousands of other students across the country after the Parkland school massacre.  The students later sued the school district alleging that their First Amendment rights had been violated.  The district’s Motion to Dismiss the case has been denied.  There are lessons to be learned from this.

Lesson one: Don’t inform parents and students that the student walkout is not “school sponsored” and then, in the litigation, claim that it was.  Schools have more authority to restrict student speech in school sponsored publications, like the yearbook or the halftime show.  So in an effort to defend the actions of school administrators who shut down kids making speeches about gun control, the lawyers for the district argued that this walkout was “school sponsored.” It’s true that the walkout happened during school hours and was permitted to happen.  The school tolerated it, but that’s not the same as “sponsoring” it.  In fact, the lawsuit alleges that the school informed the parents in advance that the walkout was student-led, optional, and not sponsored by the school. 

Lesson two: If you permit students to organize a walkout over a controversial political issue, don’t try to restrict what they say in their speeches.  The district adopted some guidelines for what could be said during this walkout. Students were to avoid discussing guns, gun control or school shootings.  Instead, they were to focus on school safety.  The district’s spokesperson apparently thought that the school had to take this stance.  The lawsuit alleges that she said “As a public institution, we cannot take a stand one way or the other on Second Amendment rights.”  And yet, according to the suit, that’s exactly what the school did. When student speakers began talking about school shootings and advocating for gun control measures, they were shut down.  So the school could hardly claim neutrality with regard to “Second Amendment rights.”

Lesson Three: The Tinker standard is alive and well.  The court applied the “material and substantial disruption” test to this situation, and found that the allegations in the suit indicated that there was no “reasonable forecast” of such a disruption. These student walkouts were limited in time and specifically permitted to occur.  In fact, the district informed the parents that no students would be disciplined for participating. 

It’s interesting to note that what seems to begin with a school effort to encourage students to exercise their Free Speech rights ends up with a lawsuit alleging that the school infringed on those rights. But if the allegations in the suit prove to be true, that’s exactly what happened.  You can’t allow a protest and then dictate what opinions the protesters will express.

The case isn’t over and we shall see what happens next.  There is another issue in this particular ruling that bears on student journalists. We will take that one up on Monday. 

The case is M.C. v. Shawnee Mission USD No. 512, decided by the federal court for Kansas on January 28, 2019.  We found it at 2019 WL 339545.

DAWG BONE: IT WASN’T THE SCHOOL THAT WAS EXPRESSING AN OPINION ABOUT THE SECOND AMENDMENT—IT WAS THE STUDENTS.  YOU HAVE TO LET THAT HAPPEN.

The Dawg barks again on Monday.

We can learn several things from the recent decision of the Court of Appeals involving a tragic bus accident that led to a student’s death. Texas law provides “governmental immunity” to school districts, which limits liability considerably.  However, districts can be liable when a school employee is negligent in the “use or operation” of a motor vehicle.  In this case the plaintiffs alleged four specific acts of negligence.  The court held that the district was immune from liability for three of them. This meant that the court lacked jurisdiction to even consider those claims.

First, there was the claim that the district was negligent in how it trained its bus drivers.  The court held such an allegation did not involve the “use or operation” of the bus. Therefore even if the district did a poor job of training its drivers, it could not be held liable for this.

Second, the plaintiffs alleged that the district was sloppy with vehicle inspection and maintenance.  That didn’t work either.  Without addressing the facts of the situation the court dismissed this claim because it did not relate to the “use or operation” of the bus.

The third claim that did not work was about negligent supervision on the bus. For example, the plaintiffs alleged that the two teacher chaperones were both sitting in the front of the bus, rather than spacing out as required by district rules.  True? We don’t know. The court held that it didn’t matter. This would be, at best, a claim of negligent supervision, which is not the same as negligence in the “use or operation” of the bus.

But the final allegation was that the driver was driving too fast.  That one was sufficient to invoke the court’s jurisdiction and keep the case alive. The court held that allegations of driving at an unsafe speed, if proven true, would “demonstrate practical, purposeful actions which are encompassed with the definitions of ‘operation’ and ‘use.’”

The case is Harlingen CISD v. Miranda, decided by the Court of Appeals for the 13^th District serving Corpus Christi and Edinburg.  It was decided on March 14, 2019, and we found it at 2019 WL 1187152.

DAWG BONE: I BET YOU THOUGHT YOU KNEW WHAT “USE OR OPERATION” MEANS.

Tomorrow: How not to handle a student walkout.

In a very brief opinion, the 5^th Circuit has affirmed the ruling of the lower court in the legendary “clock boy” case from Irving ISD.  Don’t remember the clock boy?  Let me refresh your memory.

On September 14, 2015, a 14-year old freshman at MacArthur High School in Irving ISD brought a homemade contraption to school.  He showed it to his geometry teacher, who told him it was “really nice.” Later he showed it to his English teacher.  She asked him “Is that a bomb?”  “No,” the boy responded, “it’s an alarm clock, see?”

Thus began the transformation of this obscure young man from an anonymous high school student into his new destiny: the Irving Clock Boy.

Just google it and see what happens. 

As most readers know, the boy was questioned, handcuffed, arrested, charged with a crime and suspended from school for three days.  The alleged crime was possession of a “hoax bomb.”  Later all charges were dropped, and the Irving police chief acknowledged that the entire arrest was a mistake.

The parents sued the City of Irving, the school district, the principal and several police officers.  In a decision handed down on March 13, 2018, federal judge Sam Lindsay dismissed all of the claims.  Now, the appellate court has affirmed that decision.

The case is largely about the legal doctrine of “qualified immunity.”  Qualified immunity is designed to protect governmental officials who have to make tough judgment calls.  The idea behind qualified immunity is that a government official (police officer, teacher, administrator) should not have to face legal liability just because they made a bad call.  They should be held liable only when they do something that is colossally stupid or in clear violation of the law.  I’ve not seen a case that uses the term “colossally stupid” but I think that gets at the general idea. Here is what the cases do say:

Qualified immunity is designed to protect from civil liability “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”

The lawyers for the clock boy argued that the overreaction of the Irving officials in this case satisfied that standard. The court disagreed. In so doing, the court separately analyzed the actions of the principal, the arresting officers, and the other police officers.  For our purposes, we will focus on the school principal.

The principal gave the “clock boy” a three day suspension after he was arrested and charged with possession of a hoax bomb.  As a government official who is responsible for making discretionary judgment calls every day, the principal was entitled to “qualified immunity.”  To overcome that, the plaintiff had to produce evidence that would show that the principal was “plainly incompetent” or “violated clearly established law.”

The plaintiff failed to do that.  In an earlier ruling in the same case, the judge wrote eloquently about the difficulties principals face these days:

Woe unto the principal who fails to act on a potential threat that later becomes a reality!  To hold Principal Cummings, or any other administrator, to this standard places him between the dreaded Scylla and Charbydis.

I don’t know where Scylla and Charbydis are, (east of Waco maybe?) but it certainly sounds like they are akin to the proverbial “rock” and “hard place.” 

After that ruling, the plaintiff was given the opportunity to re-plead his case to try to convince the court that the principal should be held liable. In the amended complaint the plaintiff pointed out something that had not been mentioned before—that the principal failed to comply with a procedure set out in the student handbook.  That procedure read as follows:

LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (All Grade Levels) Questioning of Students
The principal will verify and record the identity of the officer or other authority and ask for an explanation of the need to question or interview the student at school
The principal ordinarily will make reasonable efforts to notify the parents unless the interviewer raises what the principal considers to be a valid objection. (Emphasis added).

According to the allegations in the suit, which the court was assuming to be accurate, the kid was grilled at length by several armed and uniformed officers without notice to his parents, despite his repeated requests to call them.  In other words, the plaintiff did allege facts indicating that the principal violated, or at least ignored, the student handbook.  Is that a violation of “clearly established law”?

The court said no:

A deviation from an entity’s internal procedures, without more, does not show discriminatory intent or amount to a constitutional violation, as constitutional requirements may nevertheless have been met.

Thus the case against the principal, like the case against the district, was dismissed.  However, this one serves as another reminder of how important it is to follow district policy and procedure. In fact, that “procedure” in the student handbook is taken directly from Policy GRA (Local).  Check out your district’s version of GRA (Local). There is a good chance that your district has adopted the same policy.

The case is Mohamed v. Irving ISD, decided by the federal court for the Northern District of Texas on March 13, 2018.  We found it at 2018 WL 1305455. The 5^th Circuit decision was issued on March 19, 2019 and is at 2019 WL 1299923. 

DAWG BONE: WANT TO AVOID LIABILITY? DON’T DO SOMETHING COLOSSALLY STUPID OR IN VIOLATION OF CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW.

Tomorrow:  A school bus accident leads to litigation.

Imagine this scenario: you are the Coordinator for Elementary Special Education.  One morning you are summoned to an elementary school because the staff is fearful that one of the students—a boy with autism—intends to kill or otherwise do harm to students and teachers.  Among other things, the staff has confiscated the boy’s list of the people in the school who are “Subjects for Weapon X.”  You are in Connecticut—not far from Sandy Hook.

Now imagine that you are the boy’s father.  Shortly after you drop your son off at school you get a call from the school asking you to return immediately.  When you arrive at the school you see a fire engine and an ambulance.  You are informed that the school has called for the ambulance to take the boy to the Yale psych ward for an emergency evaluation.

According to the subsequent lawsuit, the dad implored the school not to take the boy away in an ambulance. The last time the little boy saw his mother before she died was when she was loaded into an ambulance.  The dad offered to take the boy, but the Coordinator said no, insisting that “it’s the law” and “there’s nothing you can do about it.”  When the boy saw the police show up he was fearful that they were going to take his father away from him.  According to the suit, the boy said “Please don’t take my father.  My mother died of cancer.  He’s the only person I have; he’s a good guy.”

Things settled down after that.  After a conversation between the Coordinator, the dad, the principal and the police, the school allowed the dad to take his son home. No ambulance. No psych ward.  No emergency evaluation.

But the dad sued the Coordinator, alleging that she intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the young boy with autism. That’s a tough case to prove, and the dad in this case fell short.  The court held that the Coordinator did not humiliate, embarrass or mistreat the student in any way. Key Quote:

Riccitelli [the Coordinator] did not abuse or misuse her authority as a school official or use it as a cloak for misconduct, as it is undisputed that Board of Education Policy required her to take action to ensure school safety under the circumstances as she understood them to be. 

In an era when school shootings are a distinct possibility, you can understand how a situation like this might unravel, even when everyone is acting in good faith. I suspect that’s the case here.  The Coordinator feared for student safety and sought to follow protocol.  The parent reacted strongly in an effort to protect the child.

This is the type of thing we talk about in the Toolbox training that our firm provides. We offer guidance on the ten “tools” available to school personnel when dealing with potentially dangerous situations like this one. 

This case is Suraci v. Hamden Board of Education, decided by the District Court in Connecticut on January 10, 2019.  We found it at 73 IDELR 173.

DAWG BONE: EMERGENCY ACTIONS MAY BE NECESSARY, BUT THEY CAN BE SECOND GUESSED.

Tomorrow: Remember the Irving “clock boy”?

There is a K-8 charter school in North Carolina that requires girls to wear skirts.  No, really—they do.  But in a 36-page decision a federal court held that this is an unconstitutional requirement. It violates the Equal Protection Clause by imposing a burden on the girls that is not “comparable” to the burden facing the boys:

Yes, the boys at the School must conform to a uniform policy as well. But plaintiffs in this case have shown that the girls are subject to a specific clothing requirement that renders them unable to play as freely during recess, requires them to sit in an uncomfortable manner in the classroom, causes them to be overly focused on how they are sitting, distracts them from learning, and subjects them to cold temperatures on their legs and/or uncomfortable layers of leggings under their knee-length skirts in order to stay warm, especially moving outside between classrooms at the School.

The court shot down the skirt requirement in the dress code pursuant to the Constitution, rather than Title IX.  In fact, the court held that Title IX does not apply to “codes of personal appearance.” So the Title IX claim was dismissed, but the girls were still successful in the suit because of the Equal Protection issue.

This is a school that prides itself on its old-school culture.  The dress code is very conservative for both sexes, but the trustees of the charter school failed to make the case that requiring skirts on the girls was essential to that vibe.  The school was both popular with parents and successful in academics, but again, the defendants failed to show that bare legs on the girls contributed to this success.  The court, without a bit of snark, noted that the “skirts requirement in this case is not consistent with community norms.”  The court continued:

Women (and girls) have, for at least several decades, routinely worn both pants and skirts in various settings, including professional settings and school settings. Females have been allowed to wear trousers or pants in all but the most formal or conservative settings since the 1970s.

Some of you may be wondering: does it make a difference that this is a charter school?  Charters are schools of choice. No one is forced to attend.  Presumably the parents knew about the dress code and chose to enroll their children there.  This issue did come up in an earlier ruling in the same case.  The court dismissed the argument, noting that the charter school’s attorneys “cite no law to support this waiver argument and do not dispute that charter schools are statutorily-defined public schools.” 

Reading this case reminded me of the stories I heard at the memorial service for Dr. Joe Parks, the first Executive Director of Region 13.  Dr. Parks was loved and respected by those who worked for him, including me.  In many ways he was a man ahead of his time.  At the memorial service I heard some of the women who worked at Region 13 in the early days—late 1960s and early 1970s—as they recalled screwing up their courage to ask the boss if he would permit the women to wear pants to work. His response: “I’ve got more important things to do here than to tell you girls what to wear to work.”

Even though they were referred to as “you girls” they counted it as a victory.   But as this case illustrates, the war is not yet over.  The case is Peltier v. Charter Day School, Inc., decided by the federal district court for the Eastern District of North Carolina on March 28, 2019.  The earlier ruling was on March 30, 2017 and can be found at 2017 WL 1194460.

DAWG BONE: THE COURT DID NOT SKIRT THE ISSUE.

Tomorrow: Toolbox Tuesday!!

Yesterday we told you about Parent v. Alief ISD and the district’s efforts to get the case tossed out based on lack of jurisdiction. The district’s first argument was that the Petition for Review was filed too late. That didn’t work.

But the second argument did.  AISD argued that the parent had not properly invoked the Commissioner’s jurisdiction because the parent had not alleged a violation of the school laws of Texas.  The parent alleged that Alief violated T.E.C. 4.001 and 4.002, which set out in broad language the “Public Education Mission and Objectives and the Public Education Academic Goals.” The Commissioner said that was not good enough to invoke his jurisdiction.  Key Quote:

Petitioner wants the same thing for her daughters that every parent wants for their children. However, Sections 4.001 and 4.002 of the Texas Education Code are aspirational for Respondent and for all school districts in Texas.  These sections do not set forth a cognizable cause of action enforceable by the Commissioner. A school district can violate these sections only by setting objectives that are contrary to those established by the Texas Education Code.  Petitioner does not allege that Respondent has done so.

So the case was dismissed.  It’s Parent v. Alief ISD, Docket No. 002-R10-09-2018, decided by Commissioner Morath on January 24, 2019.

DAWG BONE: SURELY NOBODY IS OPPOSED TO THOSE ASPIRATIONAL GOALS.

Enjoy the weekend, Readers!