All posts by Jim Walsh

A little inside baseball…

Wikipedia says that “inside baseball” is a phrase mostly used in the United States, referring to something that is understood by only a small group of insiders.  Today, the Dawg offers a little inside baseball about litigation, and some provisions of Texas law.

Parents of a student in Fort Worth ISD sued the district and a teacher over alleged physical injuries their child suffered at school.  The court dismissed all claims.  Here’s how it went:

Qualified immunity for the teacher:  The federal claim against the teacher was dismissed because the teacher asserted his “qualified immunity” and the plaintiffs failed to respond to it.  If you don’t respond, the court deems your claim “abandoned.”

Federal claims against the district: The same thing happened here. The lawyers for the district filed a detailed Motion to Dismiss this claim.  The plaintiffs did not adequately respond.  The claim is deemed “abandoned.”

Notice that the court has not told us that the claims against the teacher or the district lacked merit; the court has said that the plaintiffs failed to vigorously pursue the matter.

Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED): This claim was made against the district and the teacher. But there is a statute that says you can’t get away with that. The statute says that it you file suit against a governmental unit it constitutes “an irrevocable election by the plaintiff and immediately and forever bars any suit or recovery by the plaintiff against any individual employee of the governmental unit regarding the same subject matter.”  So the IIED claim against the teacher had to be dismissed.

Assault:  This claim against the teacher was also dismissed.  Again, there is a statute in Texas: if you sue an employee over a claim that could have been brought against the governmental unit, the suit is automatically considered one that is brought against the employee in the “official capacity.” So the claim against the teacher as an individual was dismissed. Suits against an employee in “official capacity” is really a suit against the employer.

ADA claim against the district: This claim was dismissed because it should have been the subject of a special education due process hearing.   The court held that the “gravamen” of the complaint was about lack of educational opportunity for a student with a disability.  That must go to a due process hearing officer before it goes to court.

Thus all claims were dismissed for a variety of reasons having nothing to do with the merits of the claim. Was the boy injured by school personnel? We may never know. What we do know is that the district’s lawyers displayed a good understanding of some fairly obscure legal provisions and doctrines. Inside baseball.

The case is Colin v. Fort Worth ISD, decided by the federal court for the Northern District of Texas on August 27, 2018. We found it at 2018 WL 4078272.

DAWG BONE: ALMOST AS COMPLICATED AS THE INFIELD FLY RULE.

The limits of Section 504.

Imagine that your school district has employed a teacher to work in the Life Skills unit. The teacher, it turns out, is not a good guy.  You eventually discover that he has sexually molested some of the children at school, taking advantage of their low cognitive ability.  When the police get involved, they find a large number of pornographic images and videos on his computers.  The parents of the boys who were abused sue the district, alleging several causes of action, including a violation of Section 504.

The federal court in Texas recently concluded that behavior like this does not amount to a violation of Section 504.  Section 504 is about discrimination against people with disabilities.  The statute describes three types of discrimination: 1) being excluded from a program due to your disability; 2) being denied the benefits of a program due to your disability; or 3) being otherwise discriminated against due to your disability.  The notion of “otherwise discriminated against” is pretty broad, but not broad enough to cover this situation.  Key Quote:

What allegedly occurred—[the teacher’s] physical and sexual assault of the children—is jarring, but Plaintiffs’ amended complaint does not state facts that would lead the Court to reasonably infer that MISD subjected the children to discrimination because they were disabled.

This suit is not over. The plaintiffs also sued pursuant to Title IX and Section 1983, and those claims have not been dismissed. But the case illustrates that Section 504 does not cover every bad thing that might happen to a student with a disability.  The case is Strange v. Mansfield ISD, decided by the federal court for the Northern District of Texas on August 17, 2018. We found it at 2018 WL 3950219.

 DAWG BONE: SECTION 504 COVERS ACTS OF DISCRIMINATION, BUT NOT ALWAYS ACTS OF ABUSE.

 Tomorrow: how bout a little “inside baseball”?

The disability label does not matter….except when it does.

Many court cases hold that the identification of a student’s special education label is not that big of a deal. As long as the district provides appropriate services to the student, it usually does not make much difference which disability category the district has placed the student in.  But as usual, for every “general rule” there is the exception.

A district in California learned that lesson when it concluded that a student’s hearing loss made the child eligible in the “speech or language disorder” category.  The district considered a second category, but concluded that the student did not qualify as hearing impaired because, with her hearing aids, she could hear adequately.  The court held that this was a mistake.

There are two important lessons here.  First, there are two IDEA categories that address hearing loss.  A student qualifies as “deaf” if the loss is so severe that, even with amplification, the child’s educational performance is adversely affected.  In other words, hearing aids do not help a deaf student very much.  However, a student can qualify as “hearing impaired” with a loss that is permanent, or fluctuating, that adversely affects performance, but is not severe enough to qualify as “deafness.” The court concluded that this student should have been considered for eligibility as “hearing impaired” even though she was not deaf.

Why does that matter? After all, the school did qualify the student, and did provide appropriate services. So why should the label matter? That’s the second lesson of this case.  The court pointed out that there are special provisions in the law for students identified either as “hearing impaired” or as “deaf.” Those special provisions directly address the content of the student’s IEP:

“In the case of a child who is deaf or hard of hearing,” the IEP must “consider the child’s language and communication needs, opportunities for direct communications with peers and professional personnel in the child’s language and communication mode, academic level, and full range of needs.”

So when the child might meet the definition of “deaf” or “hearing impaired” the district should specifically evaluate for the condition and make a decision. It matters.

The case is S.P. v. East Whittier City School District, decided by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals on June 1, 2018. We found it at 72 IDELR 88.

DAWG BONE: DON’T ACCUSE YOUR GRANDFATHER OF BEING DEAF WHEN HE IS ONLY HEARING IMPAIRED.

 The teacher’s behavior was “jarring” but not discriminatory.

It’s Toolbox Tuesday!! What about corporal punishment?

The Toolbox is a full day training program addressing the legal requirements in serving students with disabilities who violate the school’s Code of Conduct.  In the Toolbox we offer ten “tools” that are available to administrators, all of which comply with the law and are designed to help you serve students appropriately.

Corporal punishment is not one of the tools.  But since it remains legal in Texas, I wanted to make a few points.

  1. Corporal punishment is legal in Texas public schools. Most of the states have abolished this practice, but not us.  However, many school districts have prohibited it through local policy.
  2. Parents can opt out of the use of corporal punishment by giving written notice to the school district. Many districts go further than that, and require affirmative parent approval.
  3. An educator who applies corporal punishment to a student runs the risk of personal liability. The immunity that protects educators from personal liability for personal injuries does not apply if the educator is negligent or excessive in the use of force in the discipline of a student.
  4. District policies on the subject vary, and educators are wise to be sure they know exactly what the policy says.
  5. There is no federal or state law that makes any distinction between general education and special education students when it comes to corporal punishment.

When I’m asked about this, my bottom line (pun!) is that corporal punishment is legal, but risky.  I don’t recommend it.

It sometimes comes as a shock to parents who have moved here from other states to find out that Texas still permits this controversial practice.  One time I got a phone call from a dad who had moved here from Michigan, and was skeptical when the school administrators explained to him that Texas permits paddling.  I told him how it was, and reminded him that he was now in the Confederacy.  He said he would take the matter up with his realtor, who had assured him that he was moving into a “progressive and enlightened school district.”  I said, “Sir, you missed ‘progressive and enlightened’ by about three counties.”

DAWG BONE:  CORPORAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL.  RISKY.  NOT RECOMMENDED.

 Tomorrow: Does the disability “label” matter?

Coming to Austin?

The TASA/TASB convention is in Austin this year! So I hope some of you are headed our way.  Our law firm will have a booth in the Exhibit Hall, so all you Daily Dawg subscribers should come on by and say hello.  And we have a reception at Flemings Restaurant, just blocks from the Convention Center from 5:30-7:00.  If you are attending the Convention, come on by.

Lawyers from our firm will be doing presentations during the Convention:

SCANDAL IN PUBLIC COMMENT!

Christine Badillo and Haley Turner

8:45 Friday morning.

            2018 UPDATES TO YOUR CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS

Winnie Dominguez

10:15 Friday morning

I’m not doing any presenting, but I have been asked to warm up the crowd for the annual TASB Legal/Comedy skit on Saturday morning.

Hope to see you in Austin!

DAWG BONE: ANNUAL TASA/TASB CONVENTION: ALL THE COOL KIDS WILL BE THERE.

 Tomorrow: Toolbox Tuesday!! What about corporal punishment?

How will your cheerleaders exercise their free speech? What about your football players?

Friday in the fall means high school football!  So tonight we know that hundreds of players will take to the gridiron and battle it out.  In many stadiums, the pre-game hullabaloo reaches a crescendo as the band strikes up the fight song and the hyped up players crash through a paper banner held by the cheerleaders.  This year, those banners might contain some interesting messages.

The Texas Supreme Court decided not to hear the case involving the Kountze ISD cheerleaders and their overtly religious banners.  This has the effect of affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, which was that the words expressed on the banners were the words of the cheerleaders in their private capacity. Thus the words on the banner were protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.  The fact that the cheerleaders were wearing school uniforms and serving as the official representatives of the school was not deemed to be relevant. It’s free speech.  So if the banner espouses overtly Christian viewpoints, that’s OK.

So kids wearing uniforms bearing the name of the school, representing the school in athletic competition are free to express their personal points of view at the moment when thousands of eyes are upon them.  Question, readers: can anyone come up with a logical distinction between the cheerleader and the football player? Between the words of the banner and the symbolic gesture of taking a knee during the National Anthem?

Good luck at your game tonight.

DAWG BONE: WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE PUBLIC REACTION WHEN THE BANNER PROCLAIMS “ALLAH BE PRAISED!”

Boring but important: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

In 2017 SCOTUS decided Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, which was about the boring but important legal doctrine of “exhaustion of administrative remedies.” The case was about the tangled relationship of IDEA with Section 504. Can you sue under 504 without first asking for a special education hearing under IDEA?  After the Court’s decision, some people predicted that the “exhaustion” doctrine had been blown to smithereens, and plaintiffs would be able to take virtually any complaint straight to court.

That has turned out not to be true.  The 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals has decided a case in which a student served under a 504 plan was tossed out of court because he could have sued under IDEA.  You got that? The kid was never under IDEA and never had an IEP. He had a 504 plan, so you can understand why his lawyers figured they could sue under 504 and bypass the IDEA proceedings.  But the court disagreed. The lawyers for the student argued that he would not even have been eligible under IDEA, but the court disagreed with that as well. The student had asthma, which could qualify under “Other Health Impairment” as an IDEA disability.

The case is S.D. v. Haddon Heights Board of Education, decided by the 3rd Circuit in an unpublished decision on January 31, 2018.  We found it at 71 IDELR 143 and 722 F. App.x. 119.

DAWG BONE: IF THE “GRAVAMEN” OF THE COMPLAINT IS ABOUT THE DENIAL OF A FAPE, YOU HAVE TO GO THROUGH IDEA PROCEEDINGS.

Tomorrow:  Can you put “Beto for Texas” on a cheerleader banner?

That 15-day deadline for filing a grievance means business….

Mr. Holguin missed the deadline for filing a grievance by more than 11 years.  Whoops!  He submitted a resignation in March, 2006 after the superintendent confronted him about pornography on his work computer.  Mr. Holguin denied responsibility for this, and knew that there were others who had access to his computer.  But he chose not to press that argument at the time.  Confronted with the superintendent’s intention to seek his termination, he chose to resign.

Eleven years later Mr. Holguin came back to the school board with more explosive allegations: not only was he innocent, but the superintendent knew it.  He claimed that his resignation was coerced.

The Commissioner ruled against Mr. Holguin, without ever getting into the substance of the complaint. Did the superintendent knowingly pressure an employee to resign based on false information?  The commissioner does not say. What he does say is that Mr. Holguin could have, and should have, argued this point 11 years ago.  Key Quote:

Petitioner states on his complaint form that at the time the Superintendent confronted him, he knew he had not placed the pornography on the computer and he knew that others had access to his computer.  Based on Petitioner’s own rendition of the facts, he denied responsibility for the pornography but chose to resign rather than face a report to the authorities and termination.  This indicates that he unequivocally knew that the Superintendent was basing her decision on false information. And yet, he made no attempt to convince the Superintendent that she was mistaken or to ascertain facts to establish that the allegations against him were false. He could have spoken to the computer technician who tracked him down and contacted him eleven years later. He could have done any number of things in the exercise of reasonable diligence as required by the policy.  But he chose to resign. (Emphasis in the original).

That reference to “reasonable diligence” comes from District Policy DGBA(Local). It requires grievances to be filed “within fifteen days of the date the employee first knew or with reasonable diligence should have known, of the decision or action giving rise to the complaint or grievance.”  Mr. Holguin, according to the Commissioner, knew he was being falsely accused in March, 2006, and could have pressed the point at the time. Since he chose not to, his 2017 grievance was untimely.

The case is Holguin v. Mexia ISD, decided by Commissioner Morath on March 28, 2018.  It’s Docket No. 035-R10-08-2017.

DAWG BONE: 15-DAY DEADLINE FOR GRIEVANCES IS VALID.

Tomorrow: Can you sue under IDEA when you are a 504 student? Do you have to?

Toolbox Tuesday!! What’s the Toolbox????

It occurred to me that with the start of a new school year it might be wise for me to offer a basic introduction to “Toolbox Tuesday.” What’s this about?

I’ve been conducting Toolbox workshops for several years now.  I call it the Toolbox because we introduce ten specific actions that districts can take to deal with students with disabilities who engage in serious misconduct.  Schools are not powerless to deal with such situations, but their choices are limited and constrained by the law. So it’s important to understand what is allowed and what is not.

We begin the day with a bit of background. Why is it this way? How did this come about? So we talk about the development of the law, the evolution of our standards in serving students with disabilities and the one and only Supreme Court case that has addressed the discipline of students with disabilities.

Then we identify the ten tools, and walk through each one of them with written materials in a Q and A format that is easy to read. Along the way we offer some specific suggestions for language to be incorporated into your Code of Conduct, your BIPs and some of your forms.  The Toolbox includes some hypothetical situations that we work on as small groups.

I started doing the Toolbox after years and years of conducting workshops on this very complicated area of the law.  I grew frustrated at how confusing the law was, and how much ambiguity it contains. So I decided to try to simplify by identifying ten specific things that can be done, and giving each one of them a name. That kind of organization helps me understand things, and I’m sure it has helped those who have gone through Toolbox training.

Participants get a book that includes all of the Q and A, the sample language, the forms and some important appendices.  We generally go from about 9 to somewhere between 3 and 3:30 and leave exhausted, but better informed.

I enjoy doing these presentations because I believe they address a real problem in a positive way.  The idea is to serve kids who are hard to serve, while maintaining safety and good order at the same time. It can be done.

Let me know if you are interested.

DAWG BONE: GOT THE TOOLBELT ON. READY TO TRAVEL.

 Tomorrow: I’m filing a grievance over something that happened 11 years ago. Am I late?

Policy requires SBEC certification. Employee is not certified. Contract terminated. What could go wrong????

Ms. Uranga’s two-year contract as CFO came to an abrupt halt when the district terminated it without notice or a hearing.  It seemed pretty simple.  Ms. Uranga had a Chapter 21 contract, and all such contracts required SBEC certification.  Ms. Uranga was not SBEC certified.  Simple, right?

Not so fast.  At the time of Ms. Uranga’s termination, the district’s local policy required that all Chapter 21 contracts be held by SBEC certified people. But that’s not what the policy said when Ms. Uranga came on board.  At that time the policy said:

NO CERTIFICATION REQUIRED

Educator term contracts [meaning: Chapter 21 contracts] shall also be provided for the following positions for which neither SBEC nor the District requires current SBEC certification: chief financial officer/business manager.

So at the time of hiring, the district specifically authorized a Chapter 21 contract for this position and did not require SBEC certification.  Then it changed the policy, declared Ms. Uranga in violation of that policy, and terminated her employment.

That did not work. The Commissioner pointed out that “A school board has a right to modify a contract by changing board policy, but there are limitations to that right.  The modification cannot change the general purpose and effect of the contract.” Key Quote:

Respondent applied the amended Policy DCB(Local) to Petitioner’s contract in mid-term at the time of the amendment, substantially changing the purpose and effect of the contract and, in fact, destroying it.  Termination of Petitioner based on the modification of Policy DCB(Local) and Texas Education Code Section 21.0031 was a breach of Petitioner’s contract and caused her financial harm.

The case is Uranga v. Culberson County-Allamoore ISD, decided by Commissioner Morath on June 20, 2018. It’s Docket No. 015-R10-11-2017.

DAWG BONE: EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS INCORPORATE DISTRICT POLICY AS OF THE TIME OF EXECUTION OF THE CONTRACT.

 Tomorrow: intro to Toolbox Tuesday!